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As distributed system architectures such as peer-to-peer, grid computing and 
MANET become more popular, there is an increasing need for robust and scalable 
mechanisms to establish trust between entities.  The Trusted Platform Module (TPM), 
provides for the possibility to establish trust at the hardware level for commercial 
hardware.  While work has been done to leverage TPMs for Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) and other schemes, application of TPMs for robust identification and 
authentication in a MANET or other distributed environment have not been addressed.  
This research provides a simple analysis on the applicability of leveraging TPMs for 
enhanced computer security in today’s military environment.  A military convoy using 
laptops in a MANET is used as a hypothetical concept of operations.  The problem of 
TPM initialization of a laptop, in particular, at a depot prior to deployment is addressed.  
The initialization steps that must be performed before using a TPM in any deployment 
have been studied and described, and suggestions are provided to address possible DoD 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AIK – Attestation Identity Key, a public key pair used for TPM identification and 
remote attestation purposes.  The AIK is used to serve as an alias of the EK. 
AMC – Audit Monotonic Counter, a counter used to sequence the TPM audit logs 
across multiple sessions. 
AuthData – 160-bits of authentication data which serves as a password, typically 
of the TPM Owner, in order to access an object or the protected capabilities of the TPM. 
BIOS – Basic Input/Output System, the firmware code that is first run by a 
computer when the system is powered on. 
CA – Certificate Authority, a TTP which validates and signs CSRs in order to 
create certificates that bind an identity to a public key pair and are trusted by all entities.   
COTS – Commercial-Off-The-Shelf, typically used in reference to a commercial 
hardware or software product. 
CRL – Certificate Revocation List, a listing of the certificates that have been 
signed by a CA but are no longer valid either because they have expired or been revoked. 
CRTM – Core Root of Trust for Measurement, the point where execution begins 
on a system from a known trusted state after system power-on.  The CRTM, or RTM, is 
typically the BIOS or BIOS boot block and is a component of the TBB. 
CSR – Certificate Signing Request, a specially formatted file containing the 
identification information and public key of an entity to be signed by a CA for validation. 
DoD – Department of Defense. 
DoS – Denial of Service, a condition or method of attack which causes a resource 
to become unavailable. 
EK – Endorsement Key, a unique public key pair that is bound to a TPM and 
usually installed by TPM manufacturer.  Due to the sensitivity of using only one public 
key pair for all interactions, an AIK is used instead for TPM identification purposes. 
 xvi
IETF – Internet Engineering Task Force, an all-volunteer standards organization 
that develops and promotes Internet standards chiefly related to TCP/IP and networking. 
MANET – Mobile Ad Hoc Network, an autonomous mobile network of nodes 
which provides routing capabilities for multi-hop communication between nodes. 
PCR – Platform Configuration Register, a memory register within the TPM used 
for storing measurements of system integrity or integrity digests. 
POST – Power-On Self-Test, the initial operations performed by the BIOS when a 
system is powered on. 
PKI – Public Key Infrastructure, a public key cryptosystem that uses a TTP which 
performs the role of a CA to create certificates that bind an entity’s name to its public 
key.  Certificates signed by the CA are trusted by all entities involved in the PKI system 
and thus trust is established in the binding of an entity name to a public key pair. 
RFC – Request for Comments, a published proposal for Internet standards. 
RNG – Random Number Generator, the TPM provides a trusted source for the 
generation of random numbers. 
RTM – Root of Trust for Measurement, a computing engine, controlled by the 
CRTM, trusted to take integrity measurements and establish the chain of transitive trust. 
RTR – Root of Trust for Reporting, a computing engine trusted to report 
information held by the RTS. 
RTS – Root of Trust for Storage, a computing engine trusted to maintain a 
summary of value for integrity digests and their sequence. 
SHA-1 – Secure Hashing Algorithm, a 160-bit hash function used to take an 
integrity measurement digest of code prior to execution which is then stored into a PCR. 
SML – Stored Measurement Log, a log file that records the measurements taken 
by the RTM and used for integrity reporting along with the current value of the PCR. 
SRK – Storage Root Key, a public key pair that is used to protect the hierarchy of 
keys stored by the TPM. 
 xvii
TBB – Trusted Building Block, components of the system involved at system 
start up that are trusted in their execution.  The system BIOS is included in the TBB. 
TCG – Trusted Computing Group, an organization that develops, defines and 
promotes the TPM and other open standards for hardware-enabled trusted computing and 
security technologies.  
TCPA – Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, previous name for the TCG. 
TPM – Trusted Platform Module, a hardware microcontroller that provides 
trusted computing capabilities such as secure key generation and storage. 
TSS – TCG Software Stack, software used by the applications to interoperate with 
the TPM that includes the TPM driver and three layers of software interfaces. 
TTP – Trusted Third Party, an entity that is trusted by all other entities and is 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
AuthData – Authorization Data, often referred to as a shared-secret or password 
that is used to access protected objects of the TPM.  The TPM Owner password is a type 
of AuthData that is stored in a shielded-location in the TPM. 
Blob – a data file that is encrypted and protected by the TPM. 
Certificate – a public key bound to identity information and signed by a TTP.  
Credential – an alias for certificate. 
Depot Administrator – highly trusted and vetted person who works in the Depot 
environment to configure TPM-enabled laptops.  A Depot Administrator is responsible 
for generating, installing and handling the cryptographic keys necessary for deployment 
and will also take on the role of a TPM Owner for each laptop in order to generate and 
install the cryptographic keys necessary for configuration. 
Field Operator – trusted and authorized person who uses the TPM-enabled laptop 
in the Field environment. 
IT Environment – system hardware which defines a computing platform. 
LiveCD – a bootable CD-ROM disk that loads a fully functional operating system 
environment into RAM without the need to access a hard disk drive.  LiveCDs of the 
GNU/Linux operating system are popular for system administration tasks. 
Root of Trust – the point from which the establishment of trust must originate, 
typically used in reference to the initial configuration of the system at startup. 
TPM Owner – person responsible for the security of a platform with respect to the 
TPM configuration.  The TPM Owner is distinguished by possession of the TPM Owner 
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The need for robust identification and authentication has long been a requirement 
for production of computer systems.  Access control requires discrimination between 
those who are allowed access or not, and hence the identity of the entity requesting access 
is needed.  The challenge of authentication becomes greater when the medium of 
communication between trusted entities becomes increasingly untrusted, such as over a 
wireless network or the Internet.  The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) offers several 
advantageous features at the hardware level – such as secure key generation and storage, 
integrity measurement and reporting, as well as trusted implementations of SHA-1 and a 
random number generator.  These features enhance the level of trust that can be placed in 
the computational operations used to establish computer security  
This thesis proposes an example military scenario of a MANET deployment in 
which TPM-enabled systems are used to establish a robust identification and 
authentication process.  Before such a system can become operational, a thorough 
security analysis of its design and implementation is necessary.    This thesis begins that 
process by providing a preliminary analysis of the TPM initialization process for use in a 
distributed and hostile environment.  First, the reader is presented with background 
information on the TPM and its functional capabilities along with an introduction to 
MANET environments.  A security threat analysis is then conducted on the assumptions 
of the proposed scenario followed by an objectives and requirements formulation.  
Finally, these requirements are used to establish a depot initialization and configuration 
process to be used to establish an initial secure state in the TPM-enabled systems prior to 
their deployment in the field.  Once fielded, it is assumed that no TPM configuration 
changes are made.  The conclusion provides recommendations and considerations for use 
of TPM-enabled systems in similar scenarios as well as suggestions for future related 
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A.  TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE (TPM) 
This section describes the hardware that is used to establish trust in the PC 
platform.  By leveraging the functionality of the TPM, a platform identity can be bounded 
to a cryptographic key that has been securely generated and stored within the trusted 
hardware device.  A thorough understanding of the features and limitations of this 
hardware are described below.   
1.  Introduction 
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a special purpose microcontroller on a 
motherboard and is designed to enhance computer security by providing a basis for 
establishing trust in general-purpose computing environments.  By serving as a trusted 
hardware device for secure generation and storage of cryptographic keys, the TPM 
becomes the core enabler for creating an interoperable “trusted computing” environment 
with commercial off the shelf (COTS) computer systems as envisioned by the Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG).  The TCG, successor to the Trusted Computing Platform 
Alliance (TCPA) of computer hardware and software vendors, is a not-for-profit 
organization that develops, defines and promotes vendor neutral open standards of 
technologies, such as the TPM specification, to help users protect their information 
against the threats of malicious software and physical theft [65]. The trusted 
cryptographic capabilities that every TPM provides include: SHA-1 hashing, random 
number generation (RNG), RSA asymmetric key generation, and RSA asymmetric 
encryption and decryption.  Other asymmetric algorithms in addition to RSA, such as 
elliptic curve or DSA, may be included as well.  With this functionality, the TPM 
supports the generation of random data, generation of asymmetric and symmetric keys, 
signing and verification of stored data, confidentiality of stored data, and an ability to 
take secure measurements or metrics of the state of a system and the code it is running.  
With a TPM in place, the owner of a computer system can place trust in the 
implementation of secure cryptographic algorithms and the protection of key storage 
against software attacks. 
4 
The background information on the TPM that follows is taken primarily from the 
TPM Design Specification [57] and the TPM Protection Profile [52].  All references to 
the TPM and its capabilities will be with respect to the TPM version 1.2 specification 
unless otherwise noted. In order to discuss the security features of the TPM in more 
detail, it is necessary to first define a couple of keywords.  A protected capability is a 
TPM function whose operation needs to be correct in order to maintain trust in the TPM 
[57].  Various TPM commands that directly affect the security of stored secrets or the 
state of the TPM are considered protected capabilities.  A shielded location is any area 
that stores keys or data protected from unauthorized disclosure.  Only protected 
capabilities can be used to access shielded locations, and only protected capabilities can 
modify other protected capabilities of the TPM [64].  In this way, trust can be placed in 
the TPM’s operations. 
2.  Cryptographic Keys 
The TPM specification defines several specific built-in cryptographic keys for 
performing various functions.  All of the keys are classified as either migratable or non-
migratable.  A migratable key is not bound to a specific TPM and may be moved to 
another TPM for use, while a non-migratable key is bound, either cryptographically or 
via access control, to the TPM it is created on and will not function properly on a foreign 
TPM [52].  Note, however, that a non-migratable key may be moved between TPMs 
through a maintenance process [64]. The three most important keys found on any TPM 
are non-migratable and include the Endorsement Key (EK), Storage Root Key (SRK) and 
Attestation Identity Key (AIK).  While the RSA key generator on the TPM is capable of 
creating 512, 768, 1024, and 2048-bit keys; the minimum recommended key size is 2048 
[57].  Each TPM has only one EK and one SRK, though it is possible to create multiple 
AIKs for anonymity purposes during attestation.  Other single purpose keys may be 
created including Signing Keys, Storage Keys, Identity Keys, and Binding Keys which 
are all securely stored using the SRK [52]. 
5 
a. Endorsement Key (EK) 
The Endorsement Key (EK) within a TPM ensures that the TPM bound to 
a specific system is genuine.  The EK is a 2048 bit RSA key-pair that is non-migratable 
from one platform onto another and comes pre-installed on the TPM from the 
manufacturer along with an EK Credential and Platform Credential [57].  The EK key-
pair is made up of both a public and private key; and the EK private key is always stored 
in a shielded-location.  The EK Credential contains the EK public key and asserts that the 
owner of the EK private key is a genuine TPM conforming to the TCG specifications.  
The Platform Credential is typically a certificate that attests that a specific platform 
contains a unique TPM [64].  The EK and Platform credentials must both be validated by 
the EK in order to demonstrate platform trust [57]. The EK can be created internally 
within the TPM or externally and then inserted into the TPM, though the nature of its 
generation and whether it is revocable or not must be included within the details of the 
EK Credential [57]. 
The EK is bound to one and only one TPM, and since a TPM is bound to 
one and only one platform; through transitivity, the EK is bound to one and only one 
platform as well. Since only one EK can be bound to a TPM (the one that came from the 
manufacturer), any subsequent attempts to generate an EK or insert one into a TPM must 
fail.  Due to privacy and security considerations, the EK is not used in direct attestation of 
identity or configuration, but rather is used to create intermediary Attestation Identity 
Keys (AIKs) solely for the purpose of signing data internally generated by the TPM. 
b.  Storage Root Key (SRK) 
The Storage Root Key (SRK) is generated whenever a new TPM owner is 
established and used as the root key to protect the hierarchy of keys held within protected 
storage by a TPM [57].  The SRK is a 2048 bit RSA key-pair that is non-migratable and 
also tied to the owner of a TPM.  Under the SRK key hierarchy are two trees, one for 
migratable keys and one for non-migratable keys.  The SRK is used to encrypt and 
protect all of these keys for storage. 
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Should the SRK ever be invalidated, all keys under the SRK are also 
invalidated since they cannot be decrypted and used without the SRK.  The SRK may be 
invalidated at the will of the TPM Owner or will be invalidated as a result of the current 
ownership being invalidated.  Before the SRK is invalidated, the keys held within the 
SRK hierarchy may be backed up outside of the TPM and be reused under new TPM 
ownership or another TPM. 
c. Attestation Identity Key (AIK) 
The Attestation Identity Key (AIK) serves as an alias of the EK and is 
used to uniquely identify the TPM when it is used as a signing key for platform 
authentication and attestation.  The AIK is a 2048 bit RSA key-pair that is non-
migratable, created by the TPM Owner.  An AIK Credential is issued by a Trusted Third 
Party (TTP) or Privacy CA and includes the AIK public key along with application 
specific information and the assertion that the Credential is cryptographically bound to 
the EK private key held by a TPM. The Privacy CA is an entity trusted to verify the EK-
AIK credentials of a TPM and blind the use of the EK with the AIK to any party wishing 
to verify the TPM identity. 
There may be more than one AIK key-pair, and it is suggested for privacy 
and security reasons that a different AIK key-pair be used in each separate domain that 
the TPM operates in.  This use of multiple AIKs reduces the chance of an attacker linking 
a specific AIK or EK key-pair to personally identifiable information or the identity of the 
platform itself when multiple attestations are aggregated.  An AIK key-pair can be 
invalidated at the will of the TPM Owner or will be invalidated as a result of the current 
ownership being invalidated.  Although the EK remains unchanged across multiple TPM 
ownership changes, any AIK key-pairs associated with a specific TPM Owner at the time 
of their creation are invalidated whenever their associated Owner is invalidated. 
d. Other Keys 
Other keys, generated internally or external to the TPM, may be used and 
securely stored by the TPM.  Symmetric keys may be generated and used by the TPM 
internally or stored under the SRK hierarchy, but the TPM does not export any interface 
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for symmetric key generation.  The Random Number Generator (RNG) is exported by the 
TPM and may be used as a good source of randomness in symmetric key generation. 
Additional asymmetric keys may be generated and defined by the TPM for 
classes of specific use, including Signing Keys, Storage Keys, Identity Keys and Binding 
Keys [52].  Signing Keys are reserved for performing signing operations only.  Storage 
Keys are used only within the SRK protected storage hierarchy to RSA encrypt and 
decrypt other keys.  Identity Keys are used only for operations that require a TPM 
identity, such as the AIK.  The private key of an RSA Binding Key pair is stored within 
the TPM and used only for Unbind operations.  A Bind operation is performed by using 
the public key of the Binding Key pair to encrypt data into a file which is stored outside 
of the TPM and referred to as a blob.  The Unbind operation uses the private Binding Key 
within the TPM to decrypt to blob so that the data stored inside can be used [52].   
When keys are created, they may be labeled as migratable or not, though 
some keys are always non-migratable such as those tied to a TPM identity or Owner used 
in Platform Authentication.  Three types of keys – signing, storage and binding – may 
optionally be labeled migratable or non-migratable at the discretion of the administrator 
who generates them.  If the data to be signed or protected is valid only on the host 
hardware platform, the key should be labeled as non-migratable, whereas if the data may 
need to be backed up and restored to another hardware platform at some time in the 
future, then the key should be labeled as migratable so that the data and keys can be used 
elsewhere.  Only the EK and SRK are stored within the nonvolatile memory of the TPM 
itself and all other keys are stored within the Protected Storage Hierarchy which is 
protected by the SRK.  A listing of the types of keys found on a TPM and their properties 







Table 1  TPM Key Types and their Use 
Key Name Purpose Location Migratable
Endorsement 
Key (EK) 
An RSA key-pair that is created by the TPM 
manufacturer and serves to identify the TPM as 




A non-migratable key generated within the TPM by 
the owner that serves as the root key in the hierarchy 
of keys associated with the TPM’s Protected Storage 
Function.  Used to securely store keys and other 





Used for attestation and identification of a TPM 
enabled platform.  The public key part of the AIK is 
signed by the Trusted Third Party to create an 
identity certificate or AIK Credential. 
SRK No 
Signing Key Used by the system solely to sign messages. SRK Yes/No 
Storage Key Used to RSA encrypt and decrypt other keys. SRK Yes/No 
Identity Key Used for operations that require a TPM identity. SRK No 
Binding Key Used for Unbind operations to decrypt a data blob. SRK Yes/No 
 
3.  TPM Operations and Concepts 
a. Initialization, Start-up and Self-tests  
When a TPM goes from a power-off state to a power-on state, the TPM 
enters the initialization process.  During the initialization process, all handles, keys, 
sessions, context blobs and PCR values stored in the TPM are initialized, reloaded, or 
unloaded according to the platform environment rules [57].  As part of initialization, a set 
of self-tests are performed which include enabling the SHA-1 engine and Platform 
Configuration Registers (PCRs) for performing measurements by the BIOS and enabling 
other TPM commands for startup and continued self tests [57]. Upon receipt of the TPM 
startup command, the TPM continues to perform a complete self-test of its internal 
functions before becoming operational.  The state flow of the TPM during initialization 
(e.g. from system power-off to power-on) is illustrated in Figure 1 from [57]. 
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Figure 1 TPM Initialization State Flow Diagram from [57] 
 
Self-tests return a pass or fail response and all functions of the TPM must 
pass a self-test before they can be used.  When a failure is detected, the TPM will enter a 
shutdown mode and for all but three commands, return a “Failed Self Test” error code 
[52]. The results of the self-test are stored within the TPM for retrieval at a later time.  
Self-tests must include a test of the RNG functionality, reading and extending the 
integrity registers, EK integrity to sign and verify a known value, RSA sign and verify 
engine functionality, integrity of TPM microcode for protected capabilities, and the 
integrity of any tamper-resistance markers [57].  Self-tests performed at TPM startup can 
also be executed on demand once the TPM is fully operational.   
A TPM startup may be one of three varieties: clear, state or deactivated.  A 
clear startup mode occurs after a system reboots and the TPM is in a “cleared” state with 
default values as assigned by the TPM Owner.  A state startup will occur when the 
platform requests the TPM to recover from a saved state and continue operation.  The 
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deactivated startup informs the TPM to not perform any protected operations and this 
state can only be reset by another system reboot and TPM initialization [57]. 
b. Operational Modes 
After the TPM completes the startup and self-test procedures, it enters into 
an operational mode.  There are 8 distinct operating modes for the TPM defined by a 
combination of 3 sets of states: enabled or disabled, active or inactive, and owned or 
unowned.  The 8 states are labeled S1-S8 where S1 (enabled, active and owned) is the 
fully operational state in which all TPM functions are available and S8 (disabled, inactive 
and unowned) is the least operational state, where the only function available is to change 
state.  The default delivery state for a TPM from a manufacturer should be S8, in which  
physical access is required to transition the TPM to state S1.  It would be dangerous to 
deliver a TPM in state S5 (enabled, active and unowned) since it would allow for TPM 
ownership to possibly be taken remotely by a party other than the true owner of the 
system because physical access is then not required [57].  The eight operational modes of 
the TPM are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 TPM Operational Modes 
State Enablement Active Ownership
S1 Enabled Active Owned 
S2 Disabled Active Owned 
S3 Enabled Inactive Owned 
S4 Disabled Inactive Owned 
S5 Enabled Active Unowned 
S6 Disabled Active Unowned 
S7 Enabled Inactive Unowned 
S8 Disabled Inactive Unowned 
 
A TPM may be enabled or disabled by physical presence or with an 
Owner-authenticated command, whereby TPM Owner AuthData is required.  There is no 
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effect on the secrets or values stored within a TPM by transitioning between the enabled 
and disabled states.  A disabled TPM is unable to perform any encryption, decryption or 
integrity measurement functions, though access to some capabilities such as the SHA-1 
engine are still available [57].  The transition of a TPM between active and inactive states 
provides nearly the same effects as a transition between enabled and disabled, except a 
disabled TPM cannot perform the take ownership command (without physical presence) 
whereas an inactive (and enabled) TPM can.  Control to activate and deactivate a TPM 
allows for operator convenience, such as the ability to deactivate the TPM for a session in 
which TPM functionality is not needed [57]. 
c. Opt-in and Ownership 
While the TPM can be a useful resource for enhancing the amount of trust 
placed in computer platform operations, there are privacy concerns associated with its 
use, and therefore the Owner of the platform must “opt-in” to enable use of the TPM.  On 
a new system, the TPM ships in the disabled state by default and without any owner 
assigned to it.  If the new owner wishes to use the TPM, it is his or her responsibility to 
enable it (via the physical presence command for an unowned TPM), take ownership over 
it, and activate its use in order to assert maximum control.  An enabled TPM provides the 
platform with the ability to use the TPM and allows for the operation of taking ownership 
to occur without physical presence [57]. 
The Owner of a TPM has ultimate control over its use and is responsible 
for the security and privacy policies on the platform [64, 57]. Taking ownership of the 
TPM involves issuing a take ownership command and creating a new 160-bit Owner 
authentication value or password, referred to as the Owner’s AuthData, as well as a new 
SRK and unique tpmProof value [57].  The Owner AuthData is stored in a shielded-
location and must be protected since any entity that can prove knowledge of the Owner 
AuthData is regarded as a valid Owner of the TPM.  There can be only one owner of a 
TPM and so when a new owner is created, all TPM keys and values associated with the 
prior owner are invalidated.   
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d. Clear TPM and Revoke Trust 
The TPM may be cleared to its factory default settings by an Owner-
authenticated command or via assertion of physical presence.  Clearing the TPM does not 
affect the EK, but it does: invalidate the SRK and data protected in the SRK hierarchy, 
invalidate the TPM-unique value tpmProof and all external blobs associated with it, reset 
all volatile and non-volatile data (except the EK) to factory defaults, delete the Owner-
AuthData so that the TPM has no Owner and the PCR values are left in an unknown state 
until they are reset after a system power cycle.  During the TPM startup process, before a 
TPM becomes fully operational, any operator with physical presence may clear the TPM.  
After the TPM startup process, the TPM Owner can issue a command to disable both 
commands to clear the TPM by the Owner and by any operator with physical presence 
until the next power cycle [13, 29, 57]. 
In the rare event that all keys and values in a TPM need to be cleared, 
including the EK, the irreversible revocation of trust of the EK may be possible if the EK 
was created to be revocable.  The TPM v1.2 specification allows for the EK to be created 
as either revocable or not.  When the revoke trust command is issued, the EK is erased 
and all trust in the platform is lost since the EK and Platform credentials can no longer be 
validated without the EK.  The Owner AuthData is also deleted, along with all owner 
associated keys and state.  It is possible to reestablish trust in the platform by creating a 
new revocable EK, though the EK and Platform credentials will also need to be issued by 
a trusted entity (such as the manufacturer) which is not a trivial task [57]. 
e. Seal and Unseal 
With the TPM’s ability to take measurements of a trusted system’s state 
and store the results in the PCR registers, these same integrity metrics can be used to 
attest to a future trusted state of the system.  The Seal and Unseal operations perform 
RSA encrypt and decrypt respectively on data that has originated outside of the TPM.  In 
the Seal operation, the TPM encrypts the sensitive data, along with a PCR value and 
value of tpmProof into an encrypted file called a blob.  In order to unseal or decrypt the 
blob, the appropriate key must be used for decryption and attributes can be set such that 
the TPM must be the same (i.e., tmpProof at the time of encryption as defined in blob is 
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the same at the time of decryption) and the PCR values must be the same (which are used 
to define that the system in is the same secure state) before an unseal operation can 
successively take place.  Sealing with the PCR values attests that decryption will only 
occur if the system is in the same securely measured state.  
f.  Binding and Secure Storage 
The TPM makes feasible an unlimited amount of secure storage through 
the use of an RSA public key to securely encrypt a blob of data that is stored outside of 
the TPM as a file [52].  The TPM bind operation creates a data blob including an 
encrypted key or other sensitive data along with header information about the TPM and 
how the blob was encrypted.  For decryption, the unbind operation uses the RSA private 
key of a Binding Key pair stored within the TPM to decrypt the blob and ensures that no 
sensitive information in the blob is ever exposed outside of the TPM during the 
decryption process. 
g. TPM Command Authorization 
The TPM employs a simple access control mechanism to protected objects 
based on a 160-bit shared secret.  The shared secret is also referred to as “AuthData” for 
“authorization data” and is either enveloped within the object itself which is being 
protected, or in the case of the TPM Owner and SRK, stored inside of the TPM.  The 
TPM Owner AuthData or “password” is used to prove ownership and authorization to 
execute TPM protected capabilities.  The TPM never places AuthData in the clear except 
when stored in shielded-locations.   Outside of the TPM, the AuthData should be treated 
as a “controlled data item” and protected by a reference monitor of some kind [52, 57].  
AuthData is required for use in several TPM commands such as: TPM_CreateWrapKey, 
TPM_ChangeAuth, TPM_Seal, TPM_Sealx, and TPM_MakeIdentity. 
If any subject wishes to use a function or access an object protected by the 
TPM, the TPM will issue a challenge to that subject entity to prove that it has access to 
the AuthData for the TPM Owner or object and send along a nonce taken from the RNG 
to prevent against reply and man-in-the-middle attacks [52, 57].  If the entity’s response 
to the challenge is correct and the reply includes the same nonce sent in the challenge, the 
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TPM authenticates the entity as a fully authorized subject to access the given object. 
There are no varying modes of access controls to the objects (e.g., read-only versus read-
write), however the TPM 1.2 specification does provide for new levels of access 
granularity with the introduction of Locality and Delegation [57]. 
The Locality concept is used to provide a level of granularity for access to 
TPM commands by trusted processes [57].  Depending on the level of trust given to a 
process, it can be assigned a corresponding Locality-level that is then appended with the 
authentication method when the process makes a function call to the TPM. A maximum 
of four locality levels may be defined, but as the definition of locality varies between 
platforms, the platform specification should be consulted for its use [57]. The TPM 
Owner can then assign access permissions to protected objects and functions based on 
Locality-level.  With the TPM version 1.1b specification, if the TPM owner ever wished 
to have a process perform an Owner-authorized command, the process would have to be 
given the owner’s AuthData.  This effectively gives the process full access to the TPM as 
if it was the platform Owner.  With the Delegation feature provided, the Owner is given a 
fine-grained level of control to specify which Owner-authorized commands a process 
may invoke.  The Locality-level can be used alone or with other authorization methods 
designed by the manufacturer to provide access to these delegated commands. 
h.  Integrity Measurement and Reporting 
The TPM has the ability to record an unlimited number of integrity 
measurements of the system state by using a 160-bit cumulative hashing technique whose 
value is stored within the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs).  All PCR registers 
are shielded-locations, with a minimum of 16 PCR registers in TPM Version 1.1b and 
minimum of 24 in TPM Version 1.2 for the PC Platform [57, 61].  Whenever a new 
integrity measurement is made, this value is concatenated with the current value of the 
PCR and then hashed and stored back into the PCR.  This technique for updating the PCR 
value is illustrated in Figure 2 and is also known as “extending” the digest.  The one-way 




measurements to be taken and stored and also means that an attacker cannot feasibly 
determine a prior integrity measurement or PCR value from the current value of the PCR 
[56, 57]. 
 
 PCR[n] = SHA-1 HASH (New Measurement Value || Current PCR[n] Value) 
Figure 2  Method of Extending PCR Value 
 
i. Remote Attestation and Integrity Reporting 
By leveraging the integrity measurement and reporting mechanism 
available in the TPM along with an Attestation Identity Key (AIK), a platform is able to 
provide an authenticated identification of itself and attestation of its configuration to a 
remote entity.  This Integrity Reporting Protocol (IRP) is often referred to as “Remote 
Attestation” and is currently under research in the academic community [18, 44, 57].  
There are two methods for performing a Remote Attestation; either with the support of a 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) or via Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) which is a new 
feature introduced in TPM version 1.2.  Since DAA is outside of the scope of this thesis, 
only the TTP model will be addressed. 
A remote entity may request from a Trusted Third Party (TTP) the AIK 
Credential of a specific platform and use the credential to request an attestation of its 
configuration.  The platform would then respond by sending its PCR value signed with its 
AIK private key and securely transmit it to the requester.  The requester can then verify 
the identity of the platform by validating the signature of the response with the public key 
in the AIK Credential, and thereby verify the platform’s configuration by comparing the 
PCR values with a known value that has been previously stored [57].  
A general overview of a sample Integrity Reporting Protocol as illustrated 
in [56] is presented in Figure 3.  The details of the protocol as presented in [56] are 
simplified and quite vague but have allowed for the academic community to devise their 
own more robust protocols such as [18, 57]. The general attestation protocol in 
accordance with Figure 3 includes six steps.  First, the challenger requests one or more 
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PCR values from the platform.  An agent of the platform then collects the Stored 
Measurement Log (SML) and requests signed PCR values from the TPM, which causes 
the TPM to then return the current PCR values signed with the AIK.  The platform agent 
then collects the Platform Credential from a Trusted Third Party (TTP) repository which 
vouches for the platform identity and configuration conformance, and then sends this 
credential along with the signed PCR values and SML data back to the challenger.  The 
challenger then compares the returned PCR measurement values and log with known 
values, and then validates the AIK signature with the public key identity vouched for in 
the Platform Credential by the TTP. 
 
Figure 3  General Integrity Reporting Protocol from [56] 
 
j. Use of Physical Presence 
The TPM must provide support for the assertion of physical presence by 
some physical mechanism (e.g., hardware switch, jumper setting, keyboard interaction, or 
access to the BIOS) on the platform, however, the implementation is up to the design of 
the manufacturer.  The only guideline is that the mechanism must be difficult or 
impossible to subvert by software and must require use of some physical mechanism 
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[57].  While the TPM Owner always has complete control over the TPM, there are 
instances where the physical presence assertion must override the current TPM settings. 
The assertion of physical presence is used in the following cases: 1) No 
TPM Owner, 2) Lost Owner AuthData and 3) Operator temporary disabling of the TPM.  
An example of the first case, is when a TPM is delivered from the manufacturer does not 
have any TPM Owner assigned.  The TPM should be shipped in state S8 (disabled, 
deactivated, no owner) so that the new owner must assert physical presence to take 
ownership of the TPM and assure that no rogue software may do so beforehand.  The 
authorization data (AuthData) or Owner password that is created and stored in the TPM 
upon taking ownership is used to identify and authenticate the authorized Owner of the 
TPM.  If this AuthData is ever lost, the Owner has no way to control the TPM.  In the 
second case, when the TPM Owner AuthData is lost or the platform stolen, the operator 
can then assert physical presence to remove the current TPM Owner (and invalidate all 
keys and data values associated with that Owner) and create a new Owner by inserting a 
new authorization value.  In the final case, an operator may want to temporarily disable 
use of the TPM but not change any permanent configuration of the TPM as set by the 
TPM Owner.  This operation is considered an allowable one; so the operator may assert 
physical presence to disable the TPM for the current power cycle [57]. 
k. Auditing 
The TPM provides an auditing capability to log the execution of specific 
TPM commands.  The TPM Owner is able to control which functions generate an audit 
event at any time.  The audit value is stored internally to the TPM as a digest of integrity 
metrics used like the PCRs and externally as a list of audited commands.  It is 
recommended that only a few TPM commands will be audited, such as those that create 
identities and take control of the TPM.  Other TPM commands such as Unseal would 
likely use other logging mechanisms instead.  An audit is a two-step process, which 
includes the recording of: 1) the command executed and any input parameters and 2) the 
command response and any output parameters.   
An audit session begins when an audit command is executed while the 
PCR digest registers are in the NULL state and a current audit session does not exist [57].  
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In order to build a high endurance audit process, a non-volatile counter and volatile audit 
digest should be used, and the counter incremented by one for each time that the digest is 
extended.  In this configuration, an audit session must therefore be explicitly closed in 
order for the TPM to sign the counter and audit digest.  If the audit session is not closed 
and signed, the integrity of the audit digest cannot be confirmed, since it could have been 
truncated before the closing of the audit session [57].  The digest is set to NULL upon 
TPM Startup and whenever an audit session is signed and closed.  The audit monotonic 
counter (AMC) is used to sequence audit logs across multiple sessions.  The AMC must 
last for at least 7 years or 1,000,000 audit sessions and if it should roll over, it will start 
again at 0. 
B.  PC PLATFORM AND THE TCG 
1. Introduction 
A Trusted Platform as defined in the TCG architecture includes three components 
called the “roots of trust” whose function must be trusted to operate correctly, without 
any oversight, in order to establish the trustworthiness of the platform.  These three 
commons roots of trust include the Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM), Root of Trust 
for Storage (RTS), and Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR).  While the TPM provides the 
functionality for the RTS and RTR, components of the PC platform outside the TPM are 
responsible for the RTM.  The Trusted Building Block (TBB) of a platform includes 
those parts of the RTM required to establish trust upon system initialization.  In order for 
the platform operating system and software to communicate with the TPM, a Trusted 
Software Stack (TSS) provides a driver, library, Application Programmers Interface 
(API) and services to access the functions of the TPM [56].  A Trusted Platform is 
realized when all of these components and software are in place and operate correctly.  
2. Platform Operation and Components 
The following components are used in a Trusted Platform for the establishment of 
trust in its operation, secure storage, and attestation of its configuration. 
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a. Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) 
The RTM is the computing engine on the platform responsible for taking 
platform integrity measurements and storing them in the Platform Configuration 
Registers (PCRs).  The Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM), which is typically 
the initialization instructions in a system BIOS on a PC Platform, is that part of the RTM 
where system execution first begins after a platform reset.  With a priori trust placed in 
the execution of the CRTM, a transitive chain of trust is created for the state of the 
system. The RTM is responsible for creating this chain of transitive trust, by taking a 
measurement of the code at the next point of execution before program control moves 
there, storing the cumulative measurement value into the PCR and recording the 
sequence of measurements to a log file, the Stored Measurement Log (SML), which can 
later be used to validate the resulting digest stored by the PCR [56].  This measurement 
operation simply records what code is executed and makes no judgment as to whether the 
code can be trusted or not.  To verify if the system is in a currently measured state, a 
challenger must examine the current measurement value and log file, and then compare it 
with known states.  The measurement flow of transitive trust that precedes the execution 
flow is illustrated in Figure 4 as taken from [56]. 
 
Figure 4  Chain of Transitive Trust from [56] 
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The PCR values in a TPM are reset to their default values whenever the 
system is reset after the successful completion of the TPM power-on self-test (TPM 
POST) [57].  When a measurement of code to be executed is taken, its value is added to 
the current value of a PCR which is then rehashed with SHA-1 before being stored back 
into the PCR.  The Stored Measurement Log (SML) contains the sequences of these 
measurements which can be signed and verified to prove what states the platform has 
entered [56].  While in TPM Version 1.1  there was only one RTM, the Host Platform’s 
BIOS, the TPM Main Specification 1.2 [57] allows for multiple chains of trust to be 
established that are identified with a locality and associated with specific PCRs [60]. 
b. Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) 
The RTS uses the Storage Root Key (SRK) to provide for the secure 
storage of keys, data, and measurement values in use by the TPM.  The SRK, which 
along with the EK is embedded in the TPM, serves as the root key in a hierarchy of 
storage keys used to encrypt all others keys and data for secure storage. While the RTS 
has access to a limited amount of volatile storage inside the TPM and is optimized for the 
storage of keys, it is capable of storing an unlimited amount of data external to the TPM 
in the form of encrypted files called blobs.  Since the SRK provides the root of trust for 
storage, and the SRK is bound to the TPM Owner at the time of their creation, the RTS is 
also bound to the TPM Owner [57]. 
c. Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) 
The RTR is responsible for interacting with the RTS in order to establish 
platform identities and report integrity measurement data for remote attestation.  Since 
the RTR and RTS interaction is critical to establishing trust in the platform, this 
interaction must be protected.  In order to prevent the exposure of sensitive data protected 
by the RTS and the compromise of RTR integrity metrics, the TPM design specification 
recommends that the RTS and RTR be implemented in the same hardware package to 
avoid external observation points [57].  In the TPM, the cryptographic identity of the 
RTR is the EK, which is used only for establishing the TPM Owner and creating 
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Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs).  The AIK therefore takes the role of the RTR in signing 
integrity measurement reports on behalf of the EK. 
d. Trusted Building Block (TBB) 
The Trusted Building Block (TBB) is a core component of the RTM that 
must be trusted in order to trust the measurement of a Trusted Platform.  In examining 
various TCG design documents; there is some uncertainty as to the exact bounds of the 
TBB.  Some documentation claims that the TPM is included in the TBB [60]; while 
others claim that the TBB simply includes only the connection of the TPM to the 
motherboard itself [8, 56].   
The Trusted Building Block (TBB) of a system is platform specific.  It is 
trusted to function correctly in order to establish trust in the initial execution of the 
platform after reset, even though it contains no trusted capabilities or shielded locations 
(as found in the TPM). If a trusted mechanism for the assertion of unambiguous physical 
presence, such as a hardware switch, exists on the platform then it also must be contained 
within the TBB [60].  One possible composition of the TBB includes the Core Root of 
Trust for Measurement (CRTM), the one-to-one connection of the CRTM to the 
motherboard, the one-to-one connection of the TPM to the motherboard, and a 
mechanism for determining physical presence as illustrated and contained by the dashed 
ellipse in Figure 5 [60].  Figure 5 has been simplified from Figure 1 found in the TCG 
Client Specification for Conventional BIOS [60]. The one-to-one connection of the 
CRTM and TPM ensures that there is a physical (soldering) or logical (cryptography) 




Figure 5 Sample TBB Boundary modified from [8] 
 
The transitive chain of trust for the platform is rooted in the CRTM, which 
is where execution begins from a known trusted state after a platform reset. This chain of 
trust is maintained by the RTM as control of execution is passed on [60].   In a PC, the 
CRTM is either the BIOS Boot Block or the entire (Compound) BIOS if there is no 
separate BIOS Boot Block and POST BIOS [60]. 
e. Trusted Software Stack (TSS) 
The Trusted Software Stack (TSS) is composed of a TPM driver and three 
layers of TPM-specific software interfaces.  From the lowest to the highest level, these 
three layers include: TCG Device Driver Library (TDDL), TSS Core Services (TCS), and 
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TCG Service Provider (TSP).  Most of the TCG documentation addresses the TPM 
functions at the device driver level [56].  The device driver typically comes from the 
manufacturer of the TPM in order to take advantage of its specific implementation 
features.  The device driver is the only component of the TSS that runs in kernel mode 
and has direct access to the TPM hardware.  The device driver exposes an interface 
restricted to only one TDDL, which runs at the user-mode level.  Figure 6 from the TCG 
Architecture and TSS Specification [56, 59] provides a visual representation of these 
interface layers and their relationship to one another. 
 
Figure 6 TPM Trusted Software Stack 
 
The TDDL is an operating system-independent layer and provides an 
interface to the TPM which is accessible in user mode.  A TPM-emulator would operate 
at the TDDL level.  Since the TPM and TDDL are not multithreaded, only one instance 
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of the TDDL can communicate with the TPM device driver at a time.  Upper levels of the 
TSS can provide a multithreaded interface to the TPM [56]. 
The TCS provides access to a common set of primitives and services to 
the platform of the TPM through the TDDL Interface (TDDLI).  There is only one TCS 
per platform, and although the TCS has only single threaded access to the TPM, it may 
provide multi-threaded access at the TCS Interface (TCSI) [59].  This component 
typically runs as a system service in user-mode to accommodate the TPM’s limited 
resources by providing various TPM services. These services include: context 
management, key and credential management, measurement event manager, and for the 
synchronizing and processing of TPM commands.  The TCS is also trusted to manage 
authorization data for access control to the protected capabilities of the TPM [56]. 
The TSP provides TPM services to applications.  The TSP must provide a 
C programming interface, a dynamic linking ability, and offer a rich object-oriented 
interface for applications to make use of the full capabilities of a Trusted Platform.  It is 
envisioned that each system application will have its own TSP, and the TSP will operate 
within the same hierarchical protection domain (e.g., hardware privilege level) as the 
application itself [59].  The TSP layer includes the user interface and also processes 
authorization requests, which are then handled by the underlying TCS.  This layer is also 
responsible for providing context management across threads and cryptographic services 
to applications [56]. 
C. MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKING (MANET) 
1. Introduction 
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is a type of wireless network where each 
node or computer system participating in the network is considered to be both mobile in 
nature and able to provide routing services for other nodes in the network.  The mobile 
nodes may be composed of a network of laptops, vehicles, airplanes, or even small 
“wearable” devices.  Each node in the MANET then acts as both a client and server, and 
additionally as a mobile router whose connectivity to other nodes changes dynamically. 
These properties challenge the traditional assumptions of the client-server model and 
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static routing infrastructure that the Internet was built upon.  This dynamic peer-to-peer 
nature of routing traffic amongst the networked nodes presented a challenge that 
traditional existing protocols were not able to suitably address. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) MANET Working Group first 
formally introduced MANET to the Internet community in 1999 with the publication of 
RFC 2501, which sought to describe the salient characteristics that differentiate MANET 
from traditional networks and introduce the need to create a new intra-domain routing 
protocol to support these autonomous multi-hop wireless networks [9].  The main 
characteristics found in MANETs as defined in [9] are listed in Table 3.  Today, there are 
over 100 different ad-hoc routing protocol implementations available, each optimized in 
design to address issues in a specific network context such as bandwidth usage, 
topography dynamics and power consumption [68].  As of March 2007, the IETF 
MANET Working Group has released four routing protocols as Requests for Comments 
(RFCs), including Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV), Optimized Link State 
Routing (OLSR), Topology Dissemination Based on Reverse-Path Forwarding (TBRPF), 
and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [20]. 




The network topology of the nodes may change dynamically as each node 
may move freely. 
Bandwidth-
constrained 
Wireless link bandwidth capacity is significantly less than a wired connection 
due to the effects of multiple access, fading, noise, and interference.  
Congestion tends to be the norm instead of the exception for wireless. 
Energy-
constrained 
Mobile devices usually operate on a limited non-renewable battery power 
source.  Wireless transmission and reception consume energy, and the 
system may go into “sleep” mode to conserve energy. 
Limited Physical 
Security 
Wireless and mobile nodes generally face more threats to physical security 
than a wired system placed in a fixed location.  Eavesdropping, spoofing, 
and denial of service (DoS) attacks should be considered. 
 
2. Security Issues 
There are many security issues of concern that can be found in any wireless 
network, and particularly in the popular IEEE 802.11 or WiFi networks.  While the 
proper use of cryptography may address some of these issues, many still exist that serve 
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to illustrate the threats inherit with wireless communication.  One of the most significant 
security implications is that while the adversary may attack the network in very 
traditional ways, at the same time, they may be mobile and very difficult to locate.  Other 
inherit security issues to MANET and wireless networks are defined below. 
a. Interception and Privacy 
Interception of traffic on a wireless network is much easier since the 
traditional physical wire is now accessible to anyone within range of the wireless signal.  
Even with encryption, some routing header information must be present so that the 
packets may be routed correctly, and this reveals the identities of communicating nodes 
which can then be tracked by an adversary.  In IEEE 802.11 networks, interception is also 
easy due to the limited number channels available and the capability of many wireless 
devices to easily scan these channels for activity [29].   
b. Availability and Dependability 
Availability and dependability issues are perhaps the easiest to attack on a 
wireless network.  Jamming or flooding of a wireless communication channel is trivial to 
do since it is an attack on the physical medium (e.g., the electro-magnetic spectrum), 
which is shared and accessible to anyone.  Since IEEE 802.11 wireless networking 
operates in the overly crowded industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) bands, 
unintentional interference is even possible by other nearby devices.  Since wireless nodes 
in IEEE 802.11 networks perform collision avoidance algorithms with a back off timeout 
before retransmission, tests have shown that only a 10 percent jamming rate instead of 
full time jamming was sufficient to disable a channel [29].  Due to a limited energy 
supply from batteries in mobile devices, transmission and processing power need to be 
conserved, and when not in use the device may enter a “sleep” mode to save power.  A 
“sleep deprivation” attack may then be used to prevent a system from ever transitioning 
into sleep mode and therefore continue to cause the battery to drain by invoking 
unnecessary transmissions [29].  
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c. Access Control 
Since a MANET provides no physical access control device, such as an 
Access Point (AP) or switch, implementing access control has proven to be difficult.  In 
open access wireless networks, the injection of traffic on behalf of another node is 
possible since the data source is not authenticated and possibly anonymous.  A node may 
be identified via a unique hardware MAC address, but since these addresses can be 
spoofed in the traffic via software, access control methods should not depend on a MAC 
address alone [7].  Numerous fingerprinting methods have proven successful at 
identifying wireless device drivers and unique radio frequency sources; it is not clear that 
these can or have been implemented in existing platforms and protocols due to their 
statistical and often imprecise nature [14, 16, 23, 24].  It appears that the only proven 
method for implementing wireless network access control has been to use cryptography 
in protocols such as Wired Equivalency Protocol (WEP) and Wireless Protected Access 
(WPA) such that only those clients who can prove possession of the “secret” are given 
access to the network.  
Access control on a wireless network does not necessarily enhance 
security though, since well known attacks have shown that: WEP only provides client 
authentication which allows for man-in-the-middle attacks with a malicious AP, shared 
secrets for WEP and WPA can be easily cracked, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are 
possible by sending “logoff” and “deauthenticate” packets which are not authenticated 
and can thus be injected [4, 5, 15, 29].  Similar DoS attacks are available in wireless 
networks using the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as well [29].  More recent 
attacks have shown that due to the insecurity of various wireless card device drivers, 
packet fuzzing techniques have been demonstrated to DoS and also gain remote code 
execution privileges on laptops that simply have their wireless card enabled [6, 21, 28, 
30].  This latest groundbreaking method of attack demonstrates that network access 
control, association, firewalls and even authentication are meaningless when a remote 
attacker can wirelessly take control over a machine.  
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c. Routing Security 
Routing in a MANET serves as a double edged sword for security; for 
while the mesh topology provides excellent resilience to DoS attacks, the threat is that 
each routing node may try to maliciously route the traffic.  The most prominent attacks 
on MANET have been related to the routing protocol.  With an open access MANET, 
little trust can be placed in assuming that every node in the network will route the packets 
they receive properly.  An adversary node may then join the network and falsely 
advertise a shortest path route but then simply drop all of the packets, selectively drop 
packets, or not deliver them in a timely manner, and thus lead to a denial of service, 
resource exhaustion, or otherwise disruption of the MANET routing service.  It is 
therefore important that the nodes in a MANET be trusted to reliably implement the 
routing protocol correctly.  On the other hand, if the nodes can be trusted to implement 
the routing protocol correctly, then there is virtually no single point of failure in the 
routing as long as the network nodes remain well connected.  A wired network typically 
provides a single router or hub that provides the connection between all of the computers.  
Should this hub fail, none of the computers would be able to communicate.  Since each 
computer acts as a router in the MANET, no single router failure greatly affects the 
connectivity of the rest of the network. 
Absent link-layer encryption, robust identification and authentication of 
node traffic serves as the basis for providing integrity of data transmissions [9]  Link-
layer encryption is used in wired networks to encrypt all data from one physical point to 
another over a wire, such that no identification information is sent in plaintext, because 
presumably both endpoints know the identity of the other.  Such is not the case in a 
wireless network or MANET in particular, since each node must communicate with and 
route traffic among multiple nodes in the network. Therefore, a robust identification and 
authentication process is required to provide for the integrity of network communication 
and prevent several possible attacks, especially on MANET routing. 
d. Trusted Network Connect (TNC) 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has released specifications for the 
Trusted Network Connect (TNC) architecture to define a trustworthy and interoperable 
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solution for network access control and authorization [58].  Interfaces to the TNC will 
also allow for the exchange of Platform-Authentication information, such as is provided 
by Trusted Platforms to include the proof of platform identity and platform integrity by 
leveraging the functions of the TPM.  The TNC 3-party model achieves trusted network 
connections by having the Access Requester send a request to join the network to the 
Policy Decision Point.  The Policy Decision Point then provides a response (access 
granted or denied) to the Policy Enforcement Point which allows the Access Requester to 
connect to the network.  The final Policy Enforcement Point must be a physical device, 
such as a switch or an IEEE 802.11 Access Point (AP) that controls access to the network 
[58].  This TNC architecture is very similar to the IEEE 802.1X standard for port-based 
network access control and based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol; in which a 
client supplicant (access requester) connects to the network via an authenticator (policy 
enforcement point) and sends credentials to be verified by an authentication server 
(policy decision point).  When the credentials are verified, the authentication server 
notifies the authenticator to allow the supplicant access to the network. 
Since a MANET is an ad-hoc and autonomous wireless network, without 
any infrastructure to limit access to the “wireless network”, the TNC is not applicable to a 
MANET environment.  The functionality of the Policy Decision Point and Policy 
Enforcement Point within the TNC though, can be added to each node in the MANET to 
simulate the model and validate the identity and integrity of every node it communicates 
with.  In essence, every node in the MANET is a router and therefore a Policy 
Enforcement Point that must decide if it is willing to communicate and forward traffic for 
any other node in the network. 
D.  SERVER PLATFORM 
1. Introduction 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has released a Server Specification [62] to 
compliment the well established PC Client specification [60].  There is envisioned a need 
to provide different levels of requirements between a PC Client and a PC Server 
platform.  Some of these considerations include that a Server may need greater bandwidth 
requirements for processing many operations from clients, a Server may have multiple 
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processors and actual virtual machines running on top of the same hardware and TPM 
platform, and other considerations which take advantage of the distinctly differentiate 
roles Clients and Servers play in a Trusted Computing environment.  Other than these 
operational details, a PC Client hardware platform that meets the TCG specification is 
quite similar to the PC Server and can be used interchangeably.  Both Client and Server 
will have the same TPM base functionality (i.e., attestation of configuration, identity 
authentication, and secure storage); only the Server specification may be engineered to 
provide additional features and performance benefits. 
2. Security Issues 
The security issues for a Server have minor distinctions that differ from that of a 
Client platform.  Many Clients typically connect to a Server and download data, so the 
Server integrity must be strong since its compromise may lead to the compromise of 
many clients as well who would connect and download malicious data or code.  The data 
that Clients download from a Server may be sensitive, and with the Server online nearly 
all of the time, there is the increased risk of an attack against the server as a target of 
opportunity and value.  A higher level of availability should be provided by Servers so 
that they are always accessible by their Clients, and also the Servers should be hardened 
for greater security since they will more likely be targeted for attacks due to the greater 
amount of sensitive data they stored and online presence as an opportunity for attack.  
E. MONTEREY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (MYSEA) 
1. Introduction 
As the DoD develops the Global Information Grid (GIG) to meet its global 
information sharing needs with its multiple coalition partners, it also encounters the need 
for high assurance solutions that will enable the long awaited goal of multilevel security 
(MLS) such that a user working at a classified session level can still have read access to 
less classified information sources.  This challenge is a difficult one also because these 
sources of information traditionally come from separate specialized or so-called “stove-
piped” systems that do not interoperate uniformly with one another due to their varied 
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architectures.  The research goal of solving these challenges has lead to the creation of 
the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) Testbed at the Naval Postgraduate School.   
The objective of the MYSEA Testbed is to “explore and develop a high assurance 
heterogeneous distributed operating environment that is capable of enforcing multilevel 
security policies while maintaining support for existing applications and unmodified 
client systems” [22].  The ever evolving MYSEA Testbed has already demonstrated great 
progress in providing true MLS access to email and web pages, access to multi-level data 
stored on a trusted server, single sign-on across multiple servers, web-based access to 
legacy applications running remotely on different operating systems (Windows, UNIX, 
GNU/Linux), and single-level-at-a-time access to simulated multiple level and coalition 
networks all with a high level of information assurance in the trusted path provided from 
the authenticated end user to the data objects [40].  MYSEA is developing and 
demonstrating how interoperable high assurance computing can work with existing 
specialized, government and commercial hardware and software. 
2. Current Architecture 
The current architecture of the MYSEA Testbed consists of a few special purpose 
high assurance components to support the use of a wide array of common hardware and 
software. The MLS Server, which has met EAL-5+ evaluation by the Common Criteria, 
is a DigitalNet XTS-400 system running Secure Trusted Operating System (STOP) that 
enforces the formal Bell-LaPadula security model and the formal Biba integrity model to 
provide read/write access to data at the negotiated session level and read access to data at 
lower levels [1, 40]  The MLS Server provides a very familiar Linux-like user command 
interface and supports binary compatibility with many programs and tools compiled for 
GNU/Linux [1].  Another specialized device, the Trusted Path Extension (TPE), is a 
handheld iPAQ Pocket PC that provides a secure user interface for login and session level 
negotiation to the MLS Server via a trusted path.  Other common hardware and software 
that can be found in use in the MYSEA Testbed include: various servers and laptops 
running different operating systems (e.g., Windows 2000/XP and RedHat Linux), 
switches and Cisco VPN appliances, and various software including Commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) such as Tarantella Enterprise 3, Edge Technologies enPortal, Microsoft 
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Terminal Services, and Microsoft Office; Government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) such as 
C2PC Gateway, C2PC Client, and REPEAT 2004; and Free/Open Source Software 
(FOSS) including Apache, PostreSQL, imapd, sendmail, and Firefox. 
3. Goal Architecture 
The next evolution of the MYSEA Testbed will see the inclusion of another 
specialized device, the Trusted Channel Module (TCM), and alternative configuration of 
the C2PC system [17].  When the TCM is complete, it will enable the SECRET and 
COALITION network segments to be multiplexed to the MLS Server in a single interface 
instead of two separate interfaces.  With new support for the C2PC proxy services, the 
C2PC client will be run on a workstation instead of via a web browser on an application 
server.  Other future integrations and experiments include: MLS services for NFS and 
SAMBA, “Stateless” MLS LAN clients with persistent data and metadata stored on the 
MLS Server, and IPsec-based dynamic security services [40].  A future network 
connection for the MLS Server will be to a MANET segment to test capabilities of a 
remote node accessing the MLS services wirelessly.  Future research and development 
will include investigating the incorporation of open standards from the Trusted 
Computing Group such as a trusted client-server connection.  This would involve support 
of the PC Client serving as the Access Requestor, utilizing the Trusted Network Connect 
(TNC) to ask permission from the Policy Decision Point (PDP) to connect to the network, 
then being granted network access by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) such as a 
switch or Access Point (AP) [63].  The PDP may require TPM-level authentication and 
integrity measurements from the Access Requestor before making a decision. 
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III. SYSTEM OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The Concept of Operations (CONOP) is the detailed description of a particular 
operational scenario and the security objective to be achieved.  The background sections 
have prepared the reader with an understanding of MANET security issues as well as the 
trusted capabilities offered by TPMs.  This CONOP proposes to use TPMs to provide 
trusted machine-to-machine authentication of deployed MANET nodes using a Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI).  With a high confidence of node identification and 
authentication provided, higher-level security issues such as routing in the presence of 
malicious nodes can be addressed in future work with the Remote Attestation 
functionality found in TPMs. 
1. Introduction 
Consider the following military scenario where there is a convoy of vehicles 
deployed in the field environment traveling through hostile territory.  For navigation and 
communication purposes, each vehicle is equipped with a removable TPM-enabled 
laptop that integrates into the communication system of the vehicle to provide wireless 
communication support with all of the other vehicles in a MANET architecture.  The 
laptop is removable to facilitate system configuration within the Depot environment, but 
it is heavily protected and secured to the vehicle while in the field.  The computers are 
used to transmit data and voice directly between the vehicles, to see maps of their own 
location and that of all the other vehicles, and to coordinate unified operations in the 
field.  One of the systems at a time is dedicated to the cluster-head role to provide 
external communications wirelessly via radio, satellite or a UAV (unmanned aerial 
vehicle) to servers outside of the MANET.  Though the MANET is autonomous, should 
the cluster-head or any one of the nodes in the network gain access to new information 
from an outside source – such as intelligence, updated maps, or other materials which 
need to be shared – the node is able to broadcast or publish the information to all other 
authorized nodes within the MANET. 
34 
There are many security concerns present in this or any MANET scenario, 
particularly due to the risks and vulnerabilities of physically communicating over a 
wireless medium that is open to interception, injection and jamming by an adversary who 
could be located virtually anywhere.  There is much concern about the physical security 
of such a system, since should one of the vehicles’ laptops be captured, there is the risk of 
a loss of sensitive information and therefore also quite possibly a risk to human lives.  To 
narrow the scope of such an analysis, this study will restrict itself solely to the security 
threats that can be mitigated by the use of a TPM module.  The fundamental security 
issue to be addressed in this scenario is the secure identification and authentication of 
nodes to provide access control for joining the MANET.  While prior work exists in using 
elaborate protocols for access control in MANET and other ad-hoc based groups such as 
peer-to-peer [27, 38, 46, 47, 70], the author knows of no prior work involving TPMs to 
provide simple machine-to-machine authentication for ad-hoc based groups such as 
MANET.  The use of the TPM protects cryptographic keys against software and timing 
attacks, and to an extent, against physical loss of the platform to the adversary [41]. 
The TPM will be used to provide secure cryptographic operations for each laptop 
while in the field, such as key generation, storage, encryption, signing and verification.  
These operations will be used to support robust identification and authentication of the 
nodes to each other as well as integrity and confidentiality for their communications at a 
medium level of robustness [3].  Each TPM should be configured a priori with only the 
keys required for operational use.  This configuration shall occur while it is within the 
physically secure confines of the enterprise depot prior to deployment.  To assert a high 
level of trust in the identities and cryptographic keys of each TPM, it is essential that the 
TPMs configuration be verified for correctness.  Figure 7 provides a high level 
visualization of the systems involved. 
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Figure 7  MANET System Overview 
 
The scope of this work is to establish a process for the secure configuration of 
TPM-enabled machines prior to their deployment for use in a distributed MANET 
architecture that is within an untrusted operational environment.   
2. Field Operation 
This section provides a detailed description of how the field operations take place.  
This includes details on how the TPM-enabled laptop systems are used in the operational 
environment to add an increased level of trust. 
a. TPM Keys Used in the Field 
Each TPM-enabled laptop that is deployed in the MANET will first have 
several cryptographic keys installed on it while it is within the protected depot for 
initialization and configuration prior to its deployment.  Every key installed on a platform 
will be stored and protected by the TPM.  The keys and certificates (aka credentials) 
necessary to be installed include: the platform’s own Endorsement Key (EK), a Storage 
Root Key (SRK), at least one Attestation Identity Key (AIK), AIK Credentials tied to the 
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AIKs, the DoD CA public key and a symmetric key unique for each MANET 
deployment.  Each key and its use can be found in Table 4.   
 
Table 4  Keys Used in the Field 
Key Use 
Endorsement Key (EK) Used for decrypting messages encrypted with the AIK public key. 
Storage Root Key (SRK) Used to securely store all keys on the platform other than the EK. 
Attestation Identity Key (AIK) Used to sign messages originating from the TPM. 
AIK Credential Used to identify and authenticate the TPM as an authorized 
member of a MANET, and to distribute the AIK public key. 
DoD CA public key Used to verify the authenticity of AIK Credentials. 
MANET Symmetric Key Used for integrity and authentication when used in HMAC-SHA-1. 
 
There are other credentials (or certificates) that normally come 
preinstalled with a TPM, signed by the TPM manufacturer or system vendor, that are 
used to certify the construction and conformance of the TPM to its specification.  These 
credentials include the: Platform Credential, Endorsement Credential, Conformance 
Credential and Validation Credential.  Since the context of this military MANET scenario 
is concerned with machine-to-machine identification and authentication, and since all 
trust will be placed in the credentials signed by the DoD CA, these other credentials can 
be ignored for the purposes of this scenario since they will not be used.  Details of the 
hardware such as TPM manufacturer name, TPM model number and platform version 
that are found in the Platform Credential will be added as additional field values to AIK 
Credential signed by the DoD CA.  
b. Identification and Authentication Process 
In order to ensure that all nodes in the MANET are authorized, every node 
that communicates directly with another node must first provide mutual identification and 
authentication to each other.  The AIK credential and the DoD CA public key used to 
sign and validate the AIK credential are used to provide this identification and 
authentication.  Two nodes can identify each other by presented their credentials to one 
another in a protocol like TLS.  The TLS 1.1 [10] protocol can be used to perform mutual 
node authentication with the DoD CA to serve as the Trusted Third Party. 
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c. AIK Credential Fields 
The use of the AIK Credentials are application-specific, and as mentioned 
above, these credentials will contain arbitrary identification fields by making use of the 
extension fields available on X509v3 certificates [19].  The identification fields used in 
the AIK Credential include: the machine host name, MANET deployment name, serial 
number of hardware, version numbers of hardware and software, TPM manufacturer 
name, TPM model number, platform version, and possibly other identifying information 
that may be useful for determining access control rules.   
3.  Depot Operation 
It is very difficult to ascertain any level of trust among machines in a traditional 
MANET deployment once they have already been introduced into a hostile environment.  
Therefore, it is essential to create and define a configuration that is known to be good for 
the machines while their physical security can be assured.  To establish this trust in the 
system, a variety of methods should be employed at the depot including: security 
clearances and background investigations for all depot operators, standardized 
information security management practices such as ISO 17799/27001, configuration 
management and auditing processes for both software development and system 
configuration, code review and integrity verification, and ultimately secure handling and 
protection of cryptographic key material at all times.  The identification and 
authentication protocol will rely solely on the aforementioned keys for security.  The 
TPM provides a high level of protection for all of the keys once they are installed, 
however, the window of vulnerability from the time when the keys are generated until 
they are installed must be thoroughly addressed.  Robust and secure operating procedures 
within the Depot will ensure that the keys are protected from confidentiality and integrity 
threats from the time of their creation until their secure protection by the TPM. 
a. Keys Used in the Depot 
To provide integrity, confidentiality and authentication of the 
communications for all machines participating in the MANET, a Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) management scheme based on the TPM will be established during 
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the pre-deployment configuration process for each machine.  Each machine will leverage 
the functionality of its TPM for all security relevant cryptographic operations such as key 
generation, storage, message signing, and signature verification. All of the necessary keys 
that a machine needs will be generated and stored securely by the TPM of that machine 
prior to deployment while it is still within the physically secure confines of the enterprise 
depot.  Each TPM will store five important keys: its own platform-unique Endorsement 
Key (EK) pair, a Storage Root Key (SRK), an Attestation Identity Key (AIK), the AIK 
Credential signed by the DoD CA private key, the DoD CA public key for signature 
verification, and a symmetric key shared by each node in a single MANET deployment to 
be used for integrity and authenticity in HMAC-SHA-1. 
The EK, SRK, and AIK are standard keys used within the TPM and their 
definitions can be found above in the TPM background.  The two additional keys used in 
our MANET scenario include the DoD CA public key for signature verification of AIK 
Credentials and a symmetric key for protecting the integrity of MANET traffic.  Since 
this is a military scenario, it is assumed that the MANET nodes will also need to have 
their identities signed and credentials issued by a DoD CA.  A DoD CA serves as the root 
of trust for our scenario, and also for the many other platforms, applications and user 
certificates signed by the same CA which exist outside of our scenario.  Since all of the 
machines in this scenario and many other DoD entities place the root of their trust in this 
same DoD CA key pair, it can be assumed that the private key will be heavily guarded 
and secured by the DoD.  Each machine in the MANET will store just the public key of 
the DoD CA key pair in order to verify credentials issued by the DoD CA [11]. 
The MANET symmetric key shared amongst all machines in each 
MANET deployment is used by the HMAC-SHA-1 message digest algorithm to provide 
message integrity and authentication [39].  Due to the expensive computational cost of 
performing encryption with public keys, a public key exchange is normally used to create 
an agreed upon symmetric session key to protect message confidentiality [25].  For every 
two nodes that wish to provide message confidentiality, a Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
is used to generate a session key.  Since session keys are temporal and generated in the 
field, there is no requirement for them in the Depot.  Table 5 identifies the keys and 
certificates that will need to be installed on each TPM while at the Depot.  The three 
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columns describe which entity is responsible for generating the key or credential, where it 
will be generated at, and when it will be installed in the TPM if it has been generated 
externally.  All boxes which are highlighted in green identify a process which must take 
place within the Depot. 
 
Table 5  Keys Generated and Installed at the Depot 
Key Name Generated By Generated At Installed 
Endorsement Key (EK) TPM Manufacturer Offsite Already Installed 








AIK Credential DoD Offsite Installed at Depot 
DoD CA Public Key DoD Offsite Installed at Depot 
MANET Symmetric Key Depot 
Administrator  
Depot, External to 
TPM 
Installed at Depot 
 
b. Processing Keys at the Depot 
Every key to be used in a specific deployment must be generated in a 
location that can be trusted, and then trustworthily installed on to the TPM.  With a 
COTS TPM platform, the only key that does not need to be managed in this scenario is 
the EK which is assumed to be trusted as well as the TPM manufacturer.  The second 
column of Table 5 above lists four different entities responsible for generating the keys to 
be installed on the TPM.  The TPM Manufacturer and DoD PKI authority generate the 
keys outside of the Depot environment.  The TPM Owner is a TCG term which identifies 
an entity with access to the TPM Owner AuthData.  In this scenario, that person will be a 
Depot Administrator who will assume the role of TPM Owner in order to generate the 
keys internally on the TPM.  The Depot Administrator will also generate the MANET 
symmetric key, but this will take place outside of the TPM and thus does not require the 
TPM Owner AuthData. 
The SRK and AIK are created by the TPM Owner, and in order for this to 
happen, the TPM platform first needs to have an Owner created by establishing a new 
160-bit value for the owner authentication data.  Even if a TPM Owner is already 
established on the platform, it is recommended that the current Owner be cleared out and 
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a new Owner be established in order to start with a clean configuration for each new 
MANET deployment.  A new system being prepared for deployment with a TPM Owner 
already established is in an indeterminate configuration state and no trust can be placed in 
this configuration unless it has been known from the start and through all configuration 
changes.  When the new TPM Owner is created, the Owner’s AuthData must always be 
protected from unauthorized disclosure.  There should be only a few highly trusted 
personnel (the Depot Administrators) with the appropriate security clearances who will 
have access the TPM Owner AuthData, since this password allows full access to the TPM 
whereby the configuration can be changed or decryption keys exposed.  The TPM Owner 
and other entity AuthData will need to be backed up and securely stored for 
reconfiguration of the TPM, but by limiting its exposure to a small number of people, the 
risk of its compromise can be managed more easily. 
After new ownership is asserted on the TPM, the SRK and AIK can be 
created by the TPM Owner.  These two keys are associated with the current TPM Owner 
and when the TPM Owner is invalidated, so too will the SRK and AIKs be invalidated.  
The generation of these two keys can be trusted since the key generation takes place on 
the TPM and the TPM protects these keys in a shielded location at all times.  This key 
generation process should only take place within the Depot by the Depot Administrators.  
Of all the keys and credentials that need to be processed at the Depot prior 
to deployment, the AIK Credential will take the longest amount of time because of the 
need to interact with the DoD CA.  The DoD CA takes the role of a Trusted Third Party 
(TTP) that will bind the TPM public keys to the node’s identity information.  After the 
AIK key pair is created inside the TPM, the public key needs to be exported from the 
TPM.  This public key must then be combined with all of the identification information 
that the Depot wishes to bind to this platform, such as the MANET deployment name, 
serial number, hostname or other details.  This combination is used to generate a 
Certificate Signing Request (CSR).  The CSR is then sent to the DoD CA to sign and 
generate the AIK credential or certificate.  Once the AIK Credential is created, it needs to 
be transported back securely to the Depot.  All information in the certificate and the 
public key should be verified to match that which was sent in the CSR and then the 
signature of the DoD CA should be validated with the DoD CA public key.  After 
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confirmation of the certificate information and signature verification, the certificate can 
be trusted even though it was generated outside of the Depot.  Once that is complete, the 















Figure 8  AIK Credential Process 
 
The DoD CA public key already exists and it can be trusted by 
establishing its cryptographic binding to the actual DoD CA private key.  Any certificate 
signed by the DoD CA should be validated correctly by using the DoD CA public key.  
After assurance is made that the DoD CA public key can be trusted and is correct, the 
Depot Administrator assumes the role of TPM Owner and will use the TPM to securely 
store the DoD CA public key. 
The MANET symmetric key to be used in this scenario will be generated 
at the Depot as a 160-bit key outside of the TPM and then securely installed onto the 
system.  Though the TPM provides no external interface for symmetric key generation, it 
does provide an interface to its RNG and SHA-1 hashing algorithm.  The symmetric key 
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will be generated by an external process using these two TPM-protected functions to 1) 
collect a large amount of random data from the RNG and then 2) perform a SHA-1 hash 
on it.  Since the key generation processes (RNG and SHA-1) utilize the TPM’s protected 
functions, and the key will be installed to the TPM by the Depot Administrator within the 
physically secure confines of the Depot, the symmetric key itself can be trusted against 
disclosure. 
B. THREAT ANALYSIS 
This threat analysis of the system scenario proposed in the CONOP described 
above consists of a consideration for the usage and environmental assumptions in place, 
as well as any residual threats which require remediation.  The scenario incorporates the 
use of a TPM and TBB on the platform of each node in the MANET.  The TPM and TBB 
each have their own Common Criteria protection profiles [8, 52] which state their design 
assumptions and threats addressed in each. For the reader’s convenience, the assumptions 
and threats specified in the profiles are provided in Appendices A-D. 
1.  Assumptions 
In order to assess the threats involved in this CONOP scenario, the assumptions 
must first be clearly defined.  There are key operational environment assumptions to 
consider in this scenario including the processes and operations that take place within and 
between the TPM manufacturer, TPM, platform, MANET, Depot, and the DoD CA.  The 
assumptions presented below are named with a prefix such as “A” for a general 
assumption of the system, “AD” for a configuration assumption of the Depot, “AF” for 
an operational assumption of the Field, “AED” for assumption of the environment in the 
Depot and “AEF” for assumption of the environment in the Field. 
a. TPM Trusted Manufacture Assumption 
One common assumption made by all users of a TPM is that the TPM is 
manufactured to conform exactly to the TCG specification.  While a conventional home 
user cannot feasibly verify this, there have been some differences discovered among the 
ways TPMs from different vendors operate [43]. These TPMs may still be in accordance 
with the TCG specification even with these differences due to the liberty allowed to 
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vendors, though some TPMs may break from the specification as well [43].  Successful 
subversion of the TPM at the hardware level would be impossible to adequately test for 
or detect in most cases.  The security assumption of “trust your hardware source” is 
particularly important in a military use context and can be addressed by requiring the 
manufacturer to go through a rigorous certification process, or through the use of a 
trusted foundry to ensure that the hardware complies with the TPM 1.2 specification and 
provides no additional functionality which adversely affects the security of the TPM and 
its functions.  Since the TPM is designed for general purpose computing with the main 
intended audience being a home user, the assumption to trust the manufactured hardware 
is often taken for granted.  The threat and risk of hardware subversion is much greater to 
a military user than a home user, so this assumption must be explicitly stated: the 
hardware functions correctly and in conformance with the TCG specification.  These 
assumptions have been simplified to trust in the manufacturer and TPM itself in Table 6. 
Table 6 TPM Manufacturer Assumptions 
# Assumption Name Description 
1 A.Trusted_Manufacturer The manufacturer of the TPM is assumed to be trusted such that 
the security of the TPM is not compromised. 
2 A.Trusted_TPM The TPM is trusted to be a correct implementation of the TCG 
specification without any compromise to security. 
 
b. TPM Assumptions 
As stated in the TCPA Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Protection Profile 
(Version 1.9.7) [52], the secure usage and environmental assumptions of a TPM include: 
1) proper configuration and 2) a physically secure environment.  In Appendix A, the table 
of TPM Assumptions has been recreated from the TPM Protection Profile to include both 
the usage and environmental assumptions [52].   
The assumption that the TPM will be installed and configured properly is 
the core issue related to the establishment of remote identification and authentication in 
the MANET.  Before the system can be assumed to be in a secure state at any time in the 
future, it is essential that the system be verified to have started with a secure initialization 
and configuration.  This is established by performing all TPM installation and 
configuration within the secure confines of the Depot.  Trust in the secure initialization of 
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the system after a platform reset is accomplished by the TBB, whose assumptions follow. 
It is important to note however that the TPM is required to be present for the TBB to 
function as specified by its protection profile [8]. 
The TCPA TPM protection profile assumes a physically protected 
operating environment for the TPM.  In the context of our military MANET scenario, the 
TPM-enabled laptops are used within the confines of a military vehicle.  It is assumed 
that the military operator and the confines of the vehicle provide adequate physical 
security to the TPM platform, and that additional physical security protections are in 
place on the laptop itself.  The laptop should be secured against operator access to the 
physical presence assertion method of the TPM by unauthorized users, for example 
through the use of a biometric authenticator and PIN, or through tamper resistance of the 
laptop enclosure.  In this way, the TPM physical protection assumption can be made. 
Since the TPM has been engineered for COTS use, and because 
engineering it for tamper resistance would have been prohibitively expensive for the mass 
market, it was only engineered for tamper evidence.  The military may be willing to pay 
more though for a military-specific class of the TPM engineered for tamper resistance.  
Additional hardware protections may also be put in place to create a tamper resistant 
shield to the TPM system. 
c. TBB Assumptions 
Though the TCPA TPM Protection Profile makes the assumption of a 
secure configuration, the depth of this secure configuration analysis must also extend to 
the initialization of the platform as well.  (For a more detailed discussion how the TBB is 
involved in the platform chain of trust creation, please see the background Section “PC 
Platform and the TPM” in Chapter II.)  The only assumption in the TBB Protection 
Profile, available in Appendix B, is that a certified TPM is connected to the IT 
Environment in which the TBB operates.  The IT Environment includes the technology 
and functionality found on a PC Trusted Platform.  These assumptions also include: a 
platform reset signal which causes the CPU to reset and transfer execution immediately 
to the CRTM, the mechanism for assertion of physical presence, and access limitations 
enforced by the TPM in the absence of physical presence [8]. 
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The TBB Protection Profile provides an analysis of both a standalone TBB 
and a TBB that includes a maintenance package, which would allow for the general 
updating or replacement of the CRTM.  The assumption for our scenario is that the 
trusted platform nodes of the MANET will not include a maintenance package with their 
TBB.  The assumptions from the TBB protection profile are available in Appendix B. 
d. TSS Assumptions 
The Trusted Software Stack (TSS), as defined in previous sections, 
includes the TPM device driver, TDDL, TCS and TSP.  While the highest level of 
assurance would be provided if the TSS originated from a trusted development team (and 
the TPM from a trusted foundry), this scenario will assume only a COTS Trusted 
Platform Module.   The TPM device driver and TDDL will be assumed to be provided by 
the TPM manufacturer and operating system, though this is not necessarily so.  All layers 
of the TSS may be available from third parties and in particular as Free and Open Source 
Software (FOSS).  Along with the threat that the TPM hardware may be subverted, 
particularly if destined for military use, subversion of the TSS should also be considered.  
It would be much easier for a manufacturer or a third party to subvert a software package 
such as the TSS, rather than the TPM hardware itself.  It is assumed that the TSS is 
certified to be compliant with the TSS specifications by the TCG [59].  The TSS 
assumptions are included in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 TSS Assumptions 
# Assumption Name Description 
1 A.Certified_TSS The TSS operation is correct and can be trusted. Its trustworthiness is 
certified by the companies it originated from, including the TPM 
manufacturer or other development teams. 
 
e. Depot Assumptions 
The enterprise depot environment is assumed to provide adequate physical 
security for the TPM-enabled laptops against subversion from the time that they are 
acquired, through the process of configuration and storage until they are finally deployed 
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for use. It is assumed that only trusted personnel will be authorized access to the laptops 
for configuration purposes within the physically secure Depot environment.  The Depot 
will require all of its personnel to be vetted to a level of trust equal to or greater than all 
end users and operators of the system.  The Depot environment assumptions are provided 
in Table 8. 
Table 8 Depot Assumptions 
# Assumption Name Description 
1 AD.Trusted_Personnel All personnel operating in the Depot environment are assumed to be 
vetted to a level of trust commensurate with the level of protection 
necessary for the MANET in its field environment.  If the MANET 
operating environment will be classified, all Depot personnel will 
hold the appropriate level of clearance. 
2 AED.Physical_Security The Depot environment is assumed to be physically secure. 
 
f. Field Assumptions 
The Field environment is defined to be the operational environment that 
the MANET and TPM-enabled laptops will be used in.  For simplicity of the security 
analysis, any location outside of the Depot is considered to be the Field environment – 
where physical security cannot be assured.  The greatest threats to the MANET include 
Denial of Service (DoS) and interception of confidential information.  Since it may be 
impossible to prevent a physical level DoS attack on the electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., 
jamming) itself, we simply assume this threat will not be present.  Another, more 
threatening yet subtle kind of DoS attack, is on the MANET routing protocol, in which 
case a node may simply refuse to forward packets. It is assumed that nodes authenticated 
and authorized by the DoD CA will not perform these malicious routing DoS attacks.   
It is assumed that the nodes in the MANET will only communicate with 
other authorized nodes via mutual authentication of sender and receiver by verifying node 
credentials.  It is assumed that the confidentiality of all sensitive MANET traffic will be 
protected by encryption of strength commensurate with the value of the data to be 
protected.  The MANET of military vehicles is assumed to operate within the context of a 
convoy such that when they are mobile, they will be traveling together and remain well 
within wireless communication range of each other.  At least one node in the mostly 
autonomous MANET would be able to receive regular external updates for distribution 
47 
amongst all other nodes.  These updates would include changes to the Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL) from the DoD CA and other data that may require timely updates. 
The Field environment assumptions are available in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 Field Assumptions 
# Assumption Name Description 
1 AF.Authorized_Nodes Authorized nodes do not maliciously harm the MANET. 
2 AF.Mutual_Authorization All nodes perform mutual identification and authentication 
procedures to determine that each is authorized to communicate 
in the MANET in accordance with the DoD CA. 
3 AF.Conf_Encryption The confidentiality of the MANET communication is protected by 
encryption at a level of strength commensurate with the level of 
protection necessary for the information. 
5 AF.Trained_Operator An operator is trusted and will be trained to understand how to 
operate the system effectively and maintain system security. 
4 AEF.Stable_Config The configuration of the platform cannot be changed in the Field 
environment since configuration changes cannot be assured in an 
environment whose physical security cannot be assured. 
 
g. DoD CA and PKI Assumptions 
The DoD CA will process the creation of all certificates and credentials 
necessary for the full operation of the MANET.  The DoD CA will interface with the 
Depot in a timely manner for the processing of custom Certificate Signing Requests 
(CSRs), including any extensions such as the subject alternate field used for MANET 
node and deployment identification, and returning the requisite certificates in response.  
In the proposed scenario, updates to the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) are assumed to 
be created and distributed at least daily from the DoD CA to the MANET via secure 
communication.  Assumptions for the DoD CA and PKI process are listed in Table 10. 
 
Table 10  DoD CA and PKI Assumptions 
# Assumption Name Description 
1 A.CRL_Distribution The CRL is distributed to the MANET on a daily basis. 
2 A.CSR_SubAltFields The CA will sign a CSR with customized subject alternate fields 
 
48 
2. Threats  
There are a great number of threats to be considered in our TPM-enabled military 
MANET scenario.  Threats must be address for the overall system context, both in the 
Field and within the Depot.  Since the TPM is used to provide the foundation for all of 
the security functions in this scenario, such as identification and authentication as well as 
integrity reporting, threats to the TPM must be specifically addressed.  Fortunately, since 
the TPM has gone through the Common Criteria Evaluation and was verified at EAL 
Level 3, there is a well defined list of the threats in the TPM Protection Profile [52] that 
are considered and addressed in the construction of the TPM.  The Threats identified for 
both the TPM and TBB in their Protection Profiles can be found in Appendices C and D 
for reference.  Our scenario needs to consider these threats and any possible new ones in 
both the Depot and Field environments in order to ensure that they are mitigated by the 
system security objectives.  The identified threats have been named with the prefixes 
“TD” for a threat that applies to the Depot and “TF” for a threat that applies to the Field 
environment. 
a. Depot Threats 
There are additional threats to be considered in our scenario within the 
Depot environment.  This is where the TPM laptops are configured, their cryptographic 
keys are generated and processed, and they are operationally tested before being 
deployed.  Table 11 outlines threats to be addressed by the Depot environment.  The 
threats in Table 11 were derived from the Consistency Instruction Manual for Medium 









Table 11  Threats to Depot Security 
# Threat Name Description 
1 TD.Admin_Error An administrator may incorrectly install or configure the platform, or 
install a corrupted configuration resulting in ineffective security 
mechanisms. 
2 TD.Admin_Rogue An administrator’s intentions may become malicious resulting in 
sensitive data being compromised. 
3 TD.Audit_Compromise A malicious administrator or process may view audit records, 
cause them to be lost or modified, or prevent future audit records 
from being recorded. 
4 TD.Crypto_Compromise A malicious administrator or process may cause key, data or other 
sensitive information to be inappropriately accessed (view, modify, 
or delete) and thus compromising the cryptographic mechanisms 
and data processed by the TPM. 
5 TD.Poor_Test Lack of or insufficient tests to demonstrate the TPM functions 
operate correctly may result in incorrect behavior and potential 
security vulnerabilities.  Self-tests may check out correctly, but 
specific implementations may vary from vendor to vendor. 
 
b. Field Threats 
Additional threats may be encountered that need to be taken into 
consideration for the integrity of the system to remain robust while it is operational 
within the Field environment.  Table 12 outlines the threats to be addressed in the Field 
environment.  The threats in Table 12 were derived with guidance from the Consistency 
Instruction Manual for Medium Robustness Environments and in consideration of the 
CONOP [2]. 
 
Table 12  Threats to Field Security 
# Threat Name Description 
1 TF.Eavesdrop A malicious operator or process may observe or modify sensitive 
data transmitted between physically separate parts of the system. 
2 TF.Resource_Exhaustion A malicious operator or process may block others from the 
system resources through a resource exhaustion or denial of 
service attack.  An adversary may cause a denial of service in the 
wireless spectrum that prevents the platform from communicating.
3 TF.Replay Another wireless node may attempt unauthorized access by 
replaying authentication information. 
4 TF.Unattended_Session A malicious operator may gain unauthorized access to an 
unattended session. 
5 TF.Unidentified_Actions A potential security violation of the system may occur and not be 




The rationale for these threats exists in consideration of the capabilities of 
the TPM, administrative operators in the Depot, and the potential hazards of operating in 
a military MANET scenario.  The TPM threats are addressed by the TPM design and 
apply mostly to the administrators operating in the Depot.  Depot operating requirements 
must be rigorously enforced to ensure assurance and accountability to all processes that 
take place.  Only qualified personnel with the appropriate security clearances would be 
allowed to perform the administrative operations on the platforms, and an audit trail 
should record all people who accessed each TPM and the final TPM configurations.  To 
the furthest extent possible, automated routines, which have been certified by 
administrators of the Depot and placed under configuration management, would perform 
most of the work necessary on creating new keys internally in the TPM, distributing and 
installing new migratable keys onto the TPM, and performing the backup and 
maintenance procedures that specifically deal with sensitive data since automating 
processes will prevent the occasional user error.  In the Field environment, the operators 
will need to be trained to protect the platform equipment from unattended sessions to the 
furthest extent possible.  Remaining threats are addressed or mitigated in part by the TPM 
and the operating procedures within the Depot and Field. 
C. OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS 
The security objective definitions of a system are intended to address specific 
threats to security.  The security objectives of the TPM and the TBB have been defined in 
their Protection Profiles and for the sake of brevity and reader reference, these tables 
have been recorded in Appendices E and F [8, 52].  Further security objectives for the 
Depot and Field environments of the military MANET are below.  The prefix “OD” for 
each objective name stands for “Objective of the Depot”, “OED” stands for “Objective of 
the Environment of the Depot”, “OF” stands for “Objective of the Field”, and “OEF” 




1.  Depot Objectives 
The objectives of the Depot environment are to provide a secure configuration 
environment for the TPM platform and address the assumptions and threats identified in 
Section B “Threat Analysis” of this chapter.  The security objectives of the Depot are 
found in Table 13.  
 
Table 13  Security Objectives of the Depot 
# Objective Name Description 
1 OD.Robust_Admin_Guidance The administrators of the TPM platform in the Depot will be 
provided with the necessary information and training for 
secure configuration and installation of each laptop system. 
2 OD.Admin_Role The administrative role for configuration of the TPM-enabled 
system will be designated to select individuals so as to isolate 
administrative actions and access to sensitive information. 
3 OD.Change_Management The configuration of, and all changes to, the TPM-enabled 
system and its supporting software will be analyzed, tracked, 
and controlled throughout the system’s lifecycle. 
4 OD.Admin_Vetting The administrators of the TPM platforms will undergo a 
vetting process by which greater trust can be placed in them 
to perform their role without compromising security. 
5 OD.Audit_Protection All audit records will be protected against compromise. 
6 OD.Crypto_Handling All cryptographic material will be handled with the security 
procedures commensurate with the highest sensitivity and 
classification level of the data that the keys are authorized to 
protect in order to prevent against cryptographic compromise. 
7 OD.Thorough_Func_Testing The TPM platforms will undergo appropriate self tests as well 
as operational and security functional testing while in the 
Depot to demonstrates the security functions satisfy the 
requirements. 
8 OED.Physical_Security The Depot will provide a physically secure environment for 
the configuration of the systems. 
 
2. Field Objectives 
The objectives of the Field environment address the threats anticipated to be 
encountered within the Field.  The security objectives of the Field are found in Table 14.   
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Table 14  Security Objectives of the Field 
# Objective Name Description 
1 OF.Protect_In_Transit The system will protect user and security function data against 
compromise to integrity, confidentiality and authenticity when it is 
in transit from one node in the MANET to another.  Only 
authorized nodes will communicate within the MANET and all 
nodes will perform mutual authentication before establishing 
further communication. 
2 OF.Resource_Exhaustion The system will provide mechanisms that mitigate attempts at 
resource exhaustion encountered in the MANET protocols and 
wireless domain. 
3 OF.Replay_Detection The system will provide a means to detect and reject the replay 
of authentication by unauthorized nodes in the MANET. 
4 OF.Operator_Vetting The operators of the TPM platforms will undergo a vetting 
process by which greater trust can be placed in them to perform 
their role without compromising security. 
5 OF.Operator_Training All operators will be provided appropriate training on the 
operational and security precautions for use. 
6 OF.Robust_Access The TPM Platform will provide mechanisms that control an 
operator’s logical access to the system and explicitly deny access 
to unauthorized operators. 
7 OF.Audit_Review The system will provide the capability to selectively view audit 
information and alert the operator or administrator of identified 
potential security violations. 
8 OEF.Stable_Config All system configuration and security assumptions from the Depot 
environment will remain unchanged in the Field because there 
are no administrative system changes to be made in the Field. 
 
3. Rationale 
The Security Objectives have been defined specifically to address the threats 
identified above.  Rationale for the TPM and TBB objectives can be found in their 
Protection Profiles [8, 52]. The Rationale for the Objectives of the Depot and Field 
environments can be traced back to the assumptions and threats of these two 
environments and processes that take place therein.  The key functional differences 
between the Depot and Field environments are that one is a trusted environment and the 
other is not, such that all system configuration changes are made within the Depot and 
there is no administrative access to the systems for configuration changes once in the 
Field.  Other objectives relate to the assumptions of the TPM hardware and software as 
well as the Certificate Authority are considered outside the scope of analysis for this 
thesis. The mapping of assumptions and threats to objectives in the Depot and Field 
environments is presented in Tables 15 and 16. 
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Table 15  Objectives Mapping for Depot 












Table 16  Objectives Mapping for Field 
















The requirements of the system implementation are derived from the objectives 
defined to address the identified threats in prior sections.  The Requirements for the TPM 
and TBB, as presented in the Protection Profiles, can be found in Appendices G and H 
respectively.  The requirements for the Depot and Field environments have been created 
specifically below to implement the objectives defined above.  The prefix “RD” stands 
for “Requirement of the Depot”, “RED” stands for “Requirement of the Environment in 
the Depot”, “RF” stands for “Requirement of the Field” and “REF” stands for 
“Requirement of the Environment in the Field”. 
1. Depot Requirements 
The Security Functional Requirements of the Depot have been defined to address 
the objectives identified above and are found in Table 17.  Where possible, mappings 
from objectives to requirements have been followed as defined in Appendix B of the 
Consistency Instruction Manual for Medium Robustness Environments [2].   
Table 17  Requirements of the Depot 
# Functional Requirement Description 
1 RD.Guidance_Docs Administrator shall ensure delivery of TPM/TBB is not corrupted. 
There shall be complete and unambiguous documentation for the 
Installation, Key Generation, Startup and Administrator guidance 
on TPM operation such that the TPM Platform cannot be 
misconfigured due to unclear guidance. 
2 RD.Admin_Access The Depot shall have procedures and technical measures in 
place to ensure that only Administrators shall have access to and 
perform configuration of TPM platforms. 
3 RD.Change_Management The Depot shall have a CM plan and partial automated CM 
system to provide change control and track changes and 
problems.  Change management shall include  the 
documentation and guidance for administrators and operators.  
There shall be documented measures employed to ensure that 
integrity and confidentiality is maintained.  Operational 
procedures shall meet ISO Standards, including ISO security 
standard ISO17799. 
4 RD.Admin_Clearance Administrators at the Depot shall be properly vetted and granted 
a security clearance commensurate with the level required for 
configuring the TPM Platforms. 
5 RD.Audit_Protection Administrators controls audit events and is the only one who can 
modify or delete audit records and provide for the integrity of the 
audit trail from within the Depot. 
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6 RD.Crypto_Handling All cryptographic material shall be handled by vetted and cleared 
administrators in accordance with procedures and auditing 
defined for its classification to prevent any unauthorized 
disclosure.  All transportation and storage of cryptographic 
material shall be recorded in an audit log with a time, date and 
person responsible. 
7 RD.Vuln_Assessment There shall be a vulnerability assessment of the system 
configuration to ensure that no vulnerabilities are introduced. 
8 RD.Self_Test_Success A functional self-test of the TPM as well as operational tests for 
the hardware and software of the system shall be performed. 
9 RED.Physical_Security The Depot shall be physically secure from overt hostile actions. 
 
2. Field Requirements 
The Security Functional Requirements of the Field have been defined to address 
the Field objectives identified above and are found in Table 18.  Where possible, 
mappings from objectives to requirements have followed Appendix B of the Consistency 
Instruction Manual for Medium Robustness Environments [2].  




1 RF.MANET_Encrypt All established MANET communication shall be encrypted if it is 
sensitive in nature. 
2 RF.Resource_Protection The MANET communication protocol shall not prohibitively 
consume system resources that deny other operations to perform. 
3 RF.Replay_Detect The MANET authentication protocol shall detect and deny replay 
authentication attempts by use of timestamps and nonces. 
4 RF.Operator_Clearance All operators shall have been properly vetted and granted a 
security clearance commensurate with the level required for using 
the TPM Platforms. 
5 RF.Operator_Guidance The operator shall be provided with complete and unambiguous 
documentation and guidance for all applicable security procedures 
such as authentication and normal use such that the system 
cannot be used insecurely due to operator confusion. 
6 RF.Robust_Access Every user shall be identified and authorized before given access 
to use the system and only a limited set of services that do not 
require authentication shall be available otherwise. 
7 RF.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance security shall be placed around the TPM 
Platform while it is in use in the field such that evidence of 
tampering shall erase ownership and related information in the 
TPM. 
8 RF.Audit_Alert Any event that indicates a security violation shall generate an 
alarm.  The events shall be configured by the Security 
Administrator but evident to the Operator as well.  The operator 
shall be informed of audit events and report suspicious activities to 
the security Administrator for review at the Depot. 
9 REF.Stable_Config The configuration of the system shall remain unchanged and there 
shall not be any method for change while in the Field environment.
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3. Rationale 
The objectives and requirements for the TPM and TBB are specified in their 
respective Protection Profiles, which also include a rationale for their completeness [8, 
52].  The requirements for the Depot and Field environments have been created in 
consideration of the objectives defined and the details specific to the military MANET 
scenario as discussed in previous sections.  Since there is at least one requirement defined 
for every objective, all of the objectives have been met. A mapping of the Depot and 
Field objectives to requirements is provided in Tables 19 and 20. 
 
Table 19  Objectives to Requirements Mapping for Depot 





















Table 20  Objectives to Requirements Mapping for Field 
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IV.  TPM COMMANDS 
The TPM design specification identifies all of the commands which the TPM 
driver must support.  From TPM v1.1b to TPM v1.2, several commands were deprecated 
and deleted from the new specification while still many more were added and thus 
increased the TPM functionality.  In order to better understand the TPM functionalities 
that may be leveraged in this CONOP, those TPM commands which are considered the 
most significant and necessary are defined in Table 21.  The table provides the name of 
the TPM command itself, command category, a short description, and whether or not 
access to the command is Allowed or Blocked by default in Microsoft Windows Vista™ 
according to the TPM Command Management application.  Within the TPM 
Management Console, the TPM Command Management application provides the system 
administrator with the ability to examine each of these commands and selectively allow 
or block their use.  This is the only known application where the administrator can apply 
direct access control on TPM commands as well as within the group policy editor on 
Windows Vista™. 
From the command listing in Table 21, several categories of commands have been 
removed from the complete listing of those available since their use in this CONOP have 
not been fully defined.  Those categories of commands not included for this CONOP 
include: Migration, Maintenance Functions (except for the 
TPM_KillMaintenanceFeature command), Authorization Sessions, Delegation, Session 
Management and Monotonic Counter.  The Maintenance Functions were designed so that 
updates to the TPM may be made remotely by the TPM manufacturer.  For this CONOP, 
the TPM_KillMaintenanceFeature command was included specifically because it should 
be executed to disable any future Maintenance attempts.  All of the other commands 
would likely be used in typical TPM operations such as: the generation of keys, 
authentication operations, integrity measurement and attestation, secure storage of data, 
and secured transport of data.   
The Status (Allowed or Blocked) of these commands in Table 21 corresponds 
only to the default Status assigned to them in Microsoft Windows Vista, and to whether 
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they should be enabled or disabled within the context of the CONOP during the Depot 
and Field environments is largely left for future research.  To find the optimal balance 
between Blocked and Allowed commands, a trial and error testing phase may be 
required.  Also, this list should not be considered a definitive list until the CONOP 
implementation has been realized and tested since some commands mentioned here may 
not necessarily be needed and other commands not included here actually may be needed.  
This listing is therefore a preliminary survey of the commands available which appear to 
be of value for use in the CONOP and others that need to be considered for the security 
aspects of the CONOP. 
It is interesting to note that while optional in the TPM design, the Maintenance 
Functions have been included in this TPM (along with the critical 
TPM_KillMaintenanceFeature command) in addition to the commands for revoking the 
EK and creating a new one. The two commands which the DoD may be most concerned 
with are those which h enable it to establish their own Endorsement Keys, and this can 
be accomplished with the TPM_RevokeTrust and TPM_CreateRevocableEK commands 
which are both specified as optional commands in the TPM v1.2 design specification and 
are Allowed by default in Microsoft Windows Vista™. 
 
Table 21 TPM Commands Identified For CONOP 





This is the first command sent by 
the computer. During the boot 
process, this command is sent to 
the TPM. This command cannot 





This command warns the TPM to 
save state to non-volatile memory 





This command must follow the 
TPM_Init command. It transmits 
additional computer information 
to the TPM about the type of 
reset that is occurring at the time 
of the call. 
Allowed TPM_SelfTestFull Admin Testing 
This command tests all of the 
TPM's internal functions. Any 
failure causes the TPM to enter 
into failure mode. 
Allowed TPM_GetTestResult Admin This command provides 
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Testing manufacturer-specific and 
diagnostic information regarding 
the results of the self test. 
Allowed TPM_OwnerSetDisable Admin Opt-in 
This command allows the TPM 
owner to enable or disable the 
TPM. See the descriptions for the 
TPM_PhysicalEnable and 
TPM_PhysicalDisable commands 
for more information. 
Allowed TPM_PhysicalEnable Admin Opt-in 
This command enables the TPM. 
This command requires physical 
presence at the computer and is 
executed by the BIOS. Turning 
on the TPM involves enabling 
and activating the TPM (with 
TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated). 
Allowed TPM_PhysicalDisable Admin Opt-in 
This command disables the TPM. 
This command requires physical 
presence at the computer and 
cannot be run by the operating 
system. Turning off the TPM 
involves disabling or deactivating 
the TPM (with 
TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated). 
Allowed TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated Admin Opt-in 
This command activates or 
deactivates the TPM. This 
command requires physical 
presence at the computer and 
cannot be run by the operating 
system. Microsoft does not 
recommend that this command 
be blocked so that the TPM may 
always be deactivated by the 
operator of a particular 
environment. 
Allowed TPM_SetTempDeactivated Admin Opt-in 
This command allows the 
operator of the computer to 
deactivate the TPM until the next 
computer restart. The operator 
must either have physical 
presence at the computer or 
present the operator authorization 
value defined with the 
TPM_SetOperatorAuth 
command. 
Allowed TSC_PhysicalPresence Admin Ownership 
This command asserts physical 
presence at the computer. This 
command cannot be run by the 
operating system. 
Allowed TPM_TakeOwnership Admin Ownership 
This command takes ownership 
of the TPM with a new owner 
authorization value, derived from 
the owner password. Among 
other conditions that must be met 
before this command can run, the 
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TPM must be enabled and 
activated. 
Allowed TPM_OwnerClear Admin Ownership 
This command allows the TPM 
owner to clear the TPM. This 
means that the only key 
remaining on the TPM is the 
endorsement key. 
Allowed TPM_DisableOwnerClear Admin Ownership 
This command allows the TPM 
owner to permanently disable the 
TPM_OwnerClear command. 
Once used, the owner must run 
the TPM_ForceClear command 
to clear the TPM. 
Allowed TPM_ForceClear Admin Ownership 
This command clears the TPM. 
This command requires physical 
presence at the computer and 
cannot be run by the operating 
system. 
Allowed TPM_DisableForceClear Admin Ownership 
This command disables the 
TPM_ForceClear command until 
the computer restarts. 
Allowed TPM_GetAuditDigest Auditing This command returns the TPM audit digest. 
Allowed TPM_GetAuditDigestSigned Auditing 
This command returns a signed 
TPM audit digest and list of 
currently audited commands. 
Allowed TPM_Seal Storage Functions 
This command allows the TPM to 
seal secrets until integrity, 
computer configuration, and 
authorization checks succeed. 
Allowed TPM_Unseal Storage Functions 
This command releases secrets 
previously sealed by the TPM if 
integrity, platform configuration, 
and authorization checks 
succeed. 
Allowed TPM_Unbind Storage Functions 
This command decrypts data 
previously encrypted with the 
public portion of a TPM-bound 
key. 
Allowed TPM_GetPubKey Storage Functions 
This command allows an owner 
of a loaded key to obtain the 
public key value of that key. The 
loaded key is created using the 
TPM_LoadKey2 command. 
Allowed TPM_Sealx Storage Functions 
This command allows software to 
protect secrets so that they are 
released only if a specified 
computer configuration is 
validated.  
Allowed TPM_LoadKey2 Storage Functions 
This command loads a key into 
TPM so that the owner can set 
other actions on it. These actions 
include wrap, unwrap, bind, 
unbind, seal, unseal, and sign. 




owner to prevent the creation of a 
maintenance archive using the 
TPM_CreateMaintenanceArchive 
command. This action is valid 
until a new TPM owner is set 
using the TPM_TakeOwnership 
command. 
Allowed TPM_CertifyKey Cryptographic Functions 
This command certifies a loaded 
key (created by TPM_LoadKey2) 
with the public portion of another 
key. A TPM identity key may only 
certify non-migratable keys.  
Allowed TPM_Sign Cryptographic Functions 
This command signs data with a 
loaded signing key and returns 
the resulting digital signature. 
Allowed TPM_GetRandom Cryptographic Functions 
This command returns random 
data of a specified length from 
the TPM random number 
generator. 
Allowed TPM_StirRandom Cryptographic Functions 
This command adds entropy to 
the TPM random number 
generator state. 
Blocked TPM_SHA1Start Cryptographic Functions 
This command starts the process 
of calculating a SHA-1 digest. 
This command must be followed 
by execution of 
TPM_SHA1Update or the SHA-1 
process is invalidated. 
Blocked TPM_SHA1Update Cryptographic Functions 
This command inputs complete 
blocks of data into a pending 
SHA-1 digest (started by 
TPM_SHA1Start). 
Blocked TPM_SHA1Complete Cryptographic Functions 
This command completes a 
pending SHA-1 digest process 
and returns the resulting SHA-1 
hash output. 
Blocked TPM_SHA1CompleteExtend Cryptographic Functions 
This command completes a 
pending SHA-1 digest process, 
returns the resulting SHA-1 hash 
output, and incorporates this 
hash into a specified platform 
configuration register (PCR). 
Allowed TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair Endorsement Key Handling 
This command creates the TPM 
endorsement key (EK), if this key 
does not already exist. 
Allowed TPM_CreateRevocableEK Endorsement Key Handling 
This command creates the TPM 
endorsement key (EK). The user 
can also specify whether the EK 
can be reset, and can specify the 
authorization value necessary to 
reset this key (if this value is not 
to be generated by the TPM). 
This is an optional command that 
may not be supported by the 
computer manufacturer. 
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Allowed TPM_RevokeTrust Endorsement Key Handling 
This command clears a revocable 
TPM endorsement key 
(generated by 
TPM_CreateRevocableEK) and 
resets the TPM, if it finds the 
correct authorization value for this 
reset. This command requires 
physical presence at the platform 






This command allows the TPM 
owner to generate an Attestation 
Identity Key (AIK) that can be 
used to sign information 





This command allows the TPM 
owner to unwrap the session key 
that allows for the decryption of 
the Attestation Identity Key (AIK) 
credential, thereby obtaining 
assurance that the credential is 






This command adds a new digest 
to a specified platform 
configuration register (PCR) and 






This command returns the 
contents of a specified platform 






This command returns a signed 
digest that is a combination of the 
contents of a specified platform 
configuration register (PCR) and 
some specified external data. The 
digest is signed with a loaded 
key.  This command would be 
used for attestation purposes. 
 
In Table 22, the tasks associated with system initialization have been defined 







Table 22 TPM Commands for TPM Initialization 





To clear the TPM is to remove the owner and all 
associated keys.  TPM_OwnerClear requires 
owner authentication while TPM_ForceClear 
requires evidence of physical presence. 
Disable the 
TPM TPM_PhysicalDisable 
The TPM is disabled from use with the 
TPM_PhysicalDisable command and requires 
evidence of physical presence. 
Reinitialize 
Hard Disk None TPM use not required 
Partition 
and Format None TPM use not required 
Enable the 
TPM TPM_PhysicalEnable 
The TPM is enabled with TPM_PhysicalEnable 
and evidence of physical presence for 
authorization. 
Install OS & 
Software None TPM use not required 
Activate the 
TPM TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated
The TPM is activated (once enabled) with the 
TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated command and 
evidence of physical presence for authorization. 
Revoke 
TPM Trust TPM_RevokeTrust 
If the EK in the TPM was generated by 
TPM_CreateRevocableEK, it can be revoked with 
TPM_RevokeTrust and evidence of physical 
presence. 
Create EK TPM_CreateRevocableEK 
A revocable EK is created with the command 




Ownership of a TPM that is both enabled and 






TPM_SelfTestFull tests the internal functions of 
the TPM while TPM_GetTestResult provides 
manufacturer-specific and diagnostic information 
regarding the results of the last run self test. 
 
In Table 23, the tasks associated with system configuration are presented along 
with the TPM commands that would be used for each. 
 
Table 23 TPM Commands for System Configuration 
Task TPM Commands Description 
Create AIK TPM_MakeIdentity TPM_ActiveIdentity 
TPM_MakeIdentity generates 
an Attestation Identity Key 
(AIK) that can be used to sign 
information generated 
internally by the TPM. 
TPM_ActiveIdentity allows the 
TPM owner to unwrap the 
session key that allows for the 
decryption of the Attestation 
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Identity Key (AIK) credential, 
thereby obtaining assurance 
that the credential is valid for 
the TPM. 





TPM_LoadKey2 loads a key 
into TPM so that the owner 
can set other actions on it. 
These actions include wrap, 
unwrap, bind, unbind, seal, 
unseal, and sign. 
TPM_GetPubKey allows an 
owner of a loaded key to 
obtain the public key value of 
that key. The loaded key is 
created using the 
TPM_LoadKey2 command. 
TPM_Sign signs data with a 
loaded signing key and returns 
the resulting digital signature. 
TPM_CertifyKey verifies the 
signature of a certificate. 
Create MANET Key TPM_GetRandom TPM_StirRandom 
The SHA1 and Random 
number generator commands 
can be used to create the 
symmetric deployment key by 
collecting random data from 
the TPM_GetRandom and 
TPM_StirRandom functions. 
Install Keys TPM_Seal TPM_Sealx 
Keys and other data can be 
protected by the TPM by using 
the TPM_Seal commands. 
Backup Keys None 
The TPM is not required to 
backup the externally created 
keys and all internally created 
keys will remain within the 
TPM to maintain their integrity. 
Configure TPM TPM_KillMaintenanceFeature 
The TPM should be configured 
to disable the Maintenance 
functionality in the field 
environment,  




The TPM commands used  by 
the Disk encryption process 
remain to be determined 
though they will rely on 
integrity measurement and 








The TPM commands used to 
configure the trusted boot 
process of the TPM-enabled 
system are to be determined 
though they will rely on 
integrity measurement and 
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V. DEPOT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
The Depot management process outlines the necessary procedures to be 
accomplished before a TPM-enabled system is deployed into the field environment.  
These procedures include system hardware and software acquisition, initialization, 
configuration, and operational testing prior to deployment.  The operating systems 
considered for this process include Microsoft Windows Vista™ and GNU/Linux systems 
using the TrouSerS TSS library and Trusted Grub as the secure boot loader. 
A. ACQUISITION 
In acquiring a laptop for the context of this MANET operation, a few 
requirements and suggestions need to be kept in mind.  First of all, the system hardware 
must include a TPM (version 1.2) and a motherboard with a supporting TCG-compliant 
BIOS in order to take advantage of the core functionality required of this CONOP.  
Software requirements include a TPM-supporting operating system and TCG-compliant 
Trusted Software Stack (TSS).  The BitLocker hard drive encryption service in Microsoft 
Windows Vista™ Ultimate and Enterprise editions also requires the system BIOS to 
support USB devices at system startup [31].  In considering TPM model choices, the 
TPM specification [57] mentions there is an “optional” command for revoking trust in the 
EK.  For an entity such as the DoD in this scenario, it is advisable for heightened security 
purposes to have this optional command be available so that ultimately the DoD may 
create their own EK to trust and store on the TPM.  A listing of the required and 
suggested features of the laptop platform is provided in Table 24. 
Table 24  Acquisition Requirements and Suggestions 
Component Description Necessity 
TPM version 1.2 Latest version of TPM Required 
Supporting BIOS Should come preinstalled on motherboard Required 
USB boot functionality Standard in BIOS, for BitLocker secure boot support Required 
USB storage drive Used for BitLocker secure boot support Suggested
Revoke Trust capability TPM feature desired for DoD use Suggested
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B. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION 
Once a system that meets the requirements has been acquired, it must be 
initialized to a clean and secure state.  This will include clearing and formatting the hard 
drive, installing a new operating system from trusted media, and initializing the TPM 
with a new Owner for the environment.  The full system initialization process should take 
place before each system deployment in order to ensure that a common security 
foundation has been established on every node prior to its use in the field. 
Each task to be done during the system initialization phase is outlined in Table 25 
while those emphasized in italics are regarded as optional due to the potential technical 
and environmental limitations of revoking the EK.  While general guidance is provided 
on how to perform each task under different operating environments (e.g., BIOS and 
operating system) since an operating system is not required for many of these steps, 
detailed instructions on how to perform each task of the system initialization process in a 
Microsoft Windows Vista™ environment is provided in Appendix I, “The Depot 
Management Guide.”   
Table 25 System Initialization Tasks 
Task Name Description 
Clear TPM  Remove TPM Owner and associated information and keys if they exist 
Disable TPM Deactivate and Disable the TPM from within the BIOS 
Reinitialize Hard Disk Remove all data from hard disk 
Partition and Format Preparation of hard disk may take place during OS install 
Enable TPM Enable the POST environment to detect the TPM but do not Activate it 
Install OS & Software Install TPM-enabled OS, TSS and other software for MANET operation 
Activate TPM Activate the TPM for use by the OS and for Ownership to be taken 
Revoke TPM Trust Revoke EK if possible and desired (Optional) 
Create EK If Trust in the TPM has been revoked, then a new EK must be created and 
installed onto the TPM (Optional) 
Take Ownership Perform TPM Initialization and create new TPM Owner 
TPM Self-test Ensure TPM works functionally 
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The following sections describe the methods and tools that can be used to 
accomplish each task in the System Initialization process.  The methods illustrated below 
for both Microsoft Windows Vista™ and GNU/Linux serve only to familiarize the reader 
with the process and should not be used as instructions for performing these tasks as they 
have not been tested.  The explanations of how the tpm-tools programs function comes 
from the descriptions in the corresponding man pages. 
1. Clear the TPM 
If a TPM Owner is currently installed in the TPM, it should be removed so that a 
new TPM Owner may be installed.  When a TPM is cleared, the TPM Owner AuthData is 
deleted along with the SRK AuthData such that the keys and data associated with the past 
Owner and SRK cannot be retrieved.  The TPM may be cleared from within the BIOS, 
with physical presence serving as the authorization, or from within the operating system 
itself, where knowledge of the TPM Owner password is required to Clear the TPM.  A 
TPM that has been cleared is said to have been set to its “factory defaults” with no 
Ownership set.  On Microsoft Windows Vista™, the Microsoft Management Console 
snap-in for TPM Management provides the option to clear the TPM [36].  On 
GNU/Linux environments, the tpm-tools package of TrouSerS provides a command to 
assert physical presence and to also clear the TPM [55].  Table 26 provides an outline of 
the methods available to clear the TPM in different environments. 
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Table 26 Methods to Clear the TPM 
Environment Method 
BIOS This procedure is BIOS specific.  The BIOS Setup should provide the option 
to clear the TPM with proof of physical presence. 
Windows Vista™ The TPM Management Console must be started by running tpm.msc, and 
then click on Clear TPM… under the Actions column.  This will require the 
TPM owner password and there is no method to assert physical presence via 
the TPM Management Console. 
GNU/Linux The tpm_clear command requests the TPM to perform a clear by removing 
TPM ownership and all associated data as well as disable and deactivate the 
TPM (via the TPM_OwnerClear API).  The tpm_clear --force command skips 
the owner password prompt and relies upon the physical presence flags to be 
set (via the TPM_ForceClear API). The tpm_setpresence --assert command 
changes the TPM to the physically present state.  The tpm_setpresence 
command alone only reports the status of the TPM physical presence flags.   
 
2. Disable the TPM 
When a new TPM-enabled system is received from the manufacturer, it should be 
in state S8 (disabled, deactivated, no owner) by default as stated in Chapter III 
Background Information on the TPM Operational Modes.  If the TPM is not in this state, 
it should first be both disabled and deactivated from use.  While the TPM design 
documentation specifies that some functions may be available for use from a disabled 
TPM (e.g., SHA-1), it is unable to load keys and perform normal TPM operations when 
in the disabled state [57].  By disabling the TPM, this ensures that the tasks that follow, 
such as operating system installation and configuration, will proceed smoothly without 
any attempted restrictions that might be imposed by the TPM.  For example, in a fully 
operational TPM-enabled platform, if there are changes to the system configuration, a 
TPM that is fully enabled, activated, owned and configured may prevent the system from 
booting as a security measure against possible attacks.  In Table 27, the methods 
available for disabling the TPM are provided for several operating environments, 
including the BIOS for the method of physical presence, the Microsoft Windows Vista™ 
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operating system and the TrouSerS TSS for GNU/Linux.  For a brand new system and in 
general, the BIOS should always be used to Enable or Disable the TPM. 
 
Table 27 Methods to Disable the TPM 
Environment Method 
BIOS This procedure is BIOS specific, however, the BIOS Setup should provide 
the option to put the TPM in disabled/off and deactivated state.  
Windows Vista™ The TPM Management Console in Microsoft Windows Vista™ does not 
support the functionality to Disable the TPM but only to Deactivate it by 
turning “Off”. Simply reboot the system to Disable the TPM via the BIOS. 
GNU/Linux The tpm_setenable command alone reports the state of the TPM’s flags 
regarding the enable state.  The tpm_setenable ---disable command 
prompts for the owner password and changes the TPM to the enabled state 
(via the TPM_OwnerSetDisable API).  The --force command option to 
tpm_setenable overrides the owner password prompt and relies on physical 
presence for the operation authorization.  The command tpm_setactive --
inactive changes the TPM to the inactive state (via the 
TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated API). 
 
3. Reinitialize the Hard Disk 
If the hard drive has ever been used before, it will likely have some residual 
information on it from its last use.  Since the system is being prepared for a new 
deployment, all prior data on the drive is not needed and any prior data of significance 
would have been backed up.  Therefore, for thorough data sanitization purposes between 
deployments, the hard drive must be “zeroed out” before use by writing zeros to every 
sector of the disk.  This will remove all data ever written to the disk, such that the disk 
will appear to be as new as if it had come directly from the manufacturer.  Methods to 
reinitialize the hard disk are listed in Table 28. 
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Table 28 Methods to Reinitialize the Hard Disk 
Environment Method 
Windows Vista™ The hard disk can be reinitialized by using the diskpart tool during the 
installation of Windows Vista™ 
GNU/Linux Use the tool dd from a GNU/Linux LiveCD to write zeros to a drive with the 
input file equal to /dev/zero and the output file as the hard disk. For example, 
with hard drive /dev/hda, issue the command dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/hda. 
Third Party Use a software utility on a bootable CD from the hard disk manufacturer. 
 
4. Partition and Format  
A new hard drive must be partitioned and formatted before it can be used by an 
operating system.  In most cases, the necessary partitioning and formatting will be done 
automatically or with prompts to the user during the operating system installation.  The 
number and size of partitions, as well as the file system format to be used depends upon 
the operating system requirements and user preference.  On Microsoft Windows Vista™, 
the BitLocker hard drive encryption service, which utilizes the TPM, requires at least two 
partitions on the hard drive formatted to NTFS: one to boot from (at least 1.5GB in size) 
and one for operating system installation [35].  While the boot partition remains 
unencrypted so that the BIOS can boot it, the entire operating system partition will be 
encrypted by BitLocker to prevent unauthorized data access in the case of physical theft 
of the laptop or removal of the hard drive.  In addition to partitioning and formatting the 
hard disk during operating system installation, other methods are listed in Table 29. 
 
Table 29 Methods to Partition and Format 
Environment Method 
Windows Vista™ The hard disk can be partitioned and formatted during the installation of 
Windows Vista or done manually with the diskpart and format commands. 
GNU/Linux The hard disk can be partitioned and formatted during the installation of a 
GNU/Linux distribution or the tool gparted can be used. 
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5. Enable the TPM 
Since the TPM has previously been cleared and disabled in prior steps, its 
configuration has been restored to factory default settings and there is currently no TPM 
Owner.  For this reason, physical presence is required to enable the TPM.  Prior to 
installation of the operating system, the TPM should be enabled so that the TPM 
hardware is easily detectable by the operating system installation process.  If the 
operating system is installed while the TPM is not enabled, at a later time, the operating 
system may find that it “detects new hardware” and is not configured to handle the TPM.  
At this point of the initialization process, since there is no operating system installed, 
only the BIOS method is provided even though it may be possible to use a GNU/Linux 
LiveCD with tpm-tools and enable the TPM by asserting physical presence via software.  
The TPM should therefore be enabled but deactivated in preparation for the operating 
system installation.  The methods to enable the TPM for different environments are listed 
in Table 30. 
 
Table 30 Methods to Enable the TPM 
Environment Method 
BIOS This procedure is BIOS specific; however, the BIOS Setup should provide the 
option to put the TPM in the enabled and deactivated state. 
 
6. Install OS and Application Software 
Once the hard drive has been prepared and TPM support enabled, the operating 
system and TCG supporting software can be installed.  Using trusted media sources 
(often referred to as “golden media” in the IT industry), a TPM-supporting operating 
system should be installed along with a TCG-compliant Trusted Software Stack (TSS) to 
manage the TPM.  On Microsoft Windows Vista™, the TSS is included in the operating 
system and is referred to as TBM Base Services (TBS) [32]. On GNU/Linux and Unix-
like operating systems, the TPM driver (tpmdd) and TSS (TrouSerS) can be acquired 
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separately and installed.  Other required software should be installed at this time, such as 
software for operating the MANET and applications used in the field. 
7. Activate the TPM 
Once the operating system, TSS, and other requisite software have been installed, 
the TPM should be activated for use.  A TPM is only operational once it is in the enabled 
and activated state, and then, after a reboot, the TPM can be initialized and new 
ownership taken over.  If there currently is no owner for the TPM, then the TPM can only 
be activated and deactivated with proof of physical presence since there is no TPM 
Owner to authenticate the commands.  The tpm-tools suite for TrouSerS provides a 
command to activate and deactivate the TPM which requires evidence of physical 
presence to execute.  Table 31 identifies the methods available to activate the TPM. 
 
Table 31 Methods to Activate the TPM 
Environment Method 
BIOS This procedure is BIOS specific; however, the BIOS Setup should provide the 
option to put the TPM in the enabled and activated state. 
Windows Vista™ The TPM Management Console in Windows Vista™ cannot be used to 
activate an unowned TPM since proof of physical presence is required.   
GNU/Linux The tpm_setpresence ---assert command is used to change the TPM to the 
physically present state.  The tpm_setactive --active command then 
changes the TPM to the active state (via the TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated 
API) but after evidence of physical presence has taken place.  
 
8. Revoke TPM Trust 
As an additional measure, the TPM root of trust, the EK, may be revoked on 
certain TPMs that support the optional revocation feature for a revocable EK.  This may 
be used to remove not only the TPM Owner, but the one central key that makes the TPM 
unique and genuine as certified by the manufacturer.  If the EK is revoked, a new one 
must be generated and subsequently also the AIK and AIK credential.  Since the 
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command to revoke the EK is only available in the TSS 1.2 specification, a TSS designed 
only to meet the 1.1 specification, such as TrouSerS v0.2.0, will not support this 
additional measure.  There is concern that most generic TPMs may not even support this 
feature though, since it is optional for the manufacturer, it may therefore need to be 
custom ordered during the acquisition process. 
9. Create EK 
If the EK has been removed, by revoking trust in the TPM, then a new EK must 
be created and installed.  The command to create a new EK is an optional feature in the 
TPM v1.2 specification just as the command to revoke TPM trust is.  Since use of this 
command is not normally anticipated by traditional TPM users who have a non-revocable 
EK, there may not be common support for the command in most TCG Software Stacks.   
10. Take Ownership 
Once a TPM is in the operational mode (enabled and activated), a new TPM 
Owner should be created.  Taking Ownership of the TPM involves creating a new 
AuthData value for the TPM Owner password and the SRK.  The installation of a new 
TPM Owner concludes the TPM Initialization process.  The AuthData passwords for the 
TPM Owner and the SRK should be backed up in case that they are ever forgotten, 
preferably both to hardcopy and softcopy.  The methods for taking ownership of a TPM 
in Windows Vista™ and in GNU/Linux with TrouSerS are provided in Table 32. 
 
Table 32 Methods to Take Ownership 
Environment Method 
Windows Vista™ Use the TPM Management Console, run tpm.msc and then run Initialize 
TPM… which will launch the TPM Initialization Wizard to take TPM ownership 
GNU/Linux The tpm_takeownership command is used to setup an owner on the TPM 
(via the TPM_TakeOwnership API)  The command will prompt for the owner 
and SRK passwords and confirmation, then may take awhile to finish. 
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11. TPM Self Test 
Before a system is ready for deployment, a full self test of the TPM should be run 
in order to ensure all of its functions are working properly.  A full self test is conducted 
every time that a TPM-enable system boots.  If the TPM self test fails then the TPM will 
enter into a failure mode where no commands are accepted and the nonfunctioning TPM 
hardware therefore cannot be used for this system CONOP.  An arbitrary full self test can 
be conducted any time the TPM is on. On GNU/Linux systems, the tpm-tools package 
can be used to perform an arbitrary self test as identified in Table 33. 
 
Table 33 Methods for TPM Self Test 
Environment Method 
Windows Vista™ The TPM Management Console does not support the functionality to run a 
TPM Self-Test. Simply reboot the system and a TPM Self-Test is 
automatically executed at power-on. 
GNU/Linux The tpm_selftest command requests the TPM to perform a Self-Test (via the 
TPM_SelfTestFull command) and report the results 
 
C. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
System initialization involved setting up the TPM and operating system to be used 
on the platform.  System configuration entails setting up the system to operate within the 
context of the MANET scenario as defined in the CONOP.  Table 34 provides an 
overview of the necessary configuration steps that must be performed in order to prepare 
the system for deployment.  The specific details of how to implement each of these steps 





Table 34 System Configuration Tasks 
Task Name Description 
Create AIK At least one AIK must be created per deployment 
Create AIK Credential The AIK Credential is created by submitting a CSR to the 
DoD CA which is then signed to be authentic 
Create MANET 
Symmetric key 
A symmetric 160-bit key is generated outside of the TPM 
to be used for the HMAC-SHA-1 hash integrity check 
Install Keys The AIK Credential, DoD CA Public Key and MANET 
Symmetric Key must be installed on to the TPM 
Backup Keys Backup all relevant keys and configuration information, 
including SRK, AIK, and AIK Credential per system.  There 
is only one DoD CA Public key to backup and one MANET 
Symmetric key to backup per deployment. 
Configure TPM Configure which commands are allowed and disallowed 
Configure Disk 
Encryption 
Hard disk encryption that uses the TPM should be 
installed to protect the keys and data in the case of theft 
Configure Trusted Boot A trusted boot process must be enforced by the TPM to 
ensure the system has started from a secure state 
 
1. Create AIK 
At least one AIK is needed for the TPM to sign data as an identity associated in a 
specific MANET deployment.  The AIK key pair can be created using the TSS library 
interface to the TPM with the TPM_MakeIdentity command. 
2. Create AIK Credential 
Once the AIK key pair has been created, the public key is combined with 
additional identifying information (i.e., such as the machine host name, MANET 
deployment name, serial number of hardware, version numbers of hardware and software, 
TPM manufacturer name, TPM model number, platform version) about the platform into 
a certificate signing request (CSR) which is then sent securely to the DoD CA.  Upon 
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receipt of the CSR, the DoD CA will sign the CSR to create the AIK Credential and 
securely transmit the AIK Credential back to the Depot administrator.  Once the Depot 
administrator receives the AIK Credential, its signature should be validated with the 
authenticated DoD CA public key.  The signed information if the AIK Credential must 
also be verified to match with the information sent in the corresponding CSR.  Trust in 
the DoD CA implies trust in the authenticity of the AIK Credential.  
3. Create MANET Symmetric Key 
The MANET symmetric key shared for a single deployment and used in HMAC-
SHA-1 integrity checksums is generated outside of the TPM, but will use the true random 
number generator of a TPM to generate the 160-bit key.  The integrity and confidentiality 
of this symmetric key will be protected prior to its installation into the TPM by sealing it.  
Successive calls to the TPM commands TPM_StirRandom and TPM_GetRandom will be 
used to generate a 160-bit value for the symmetric key. 
4. Install Keys 
All of the keys and cryptographic material created outside of the TPM must be 
installed and stored into the Storage Key Hierarchy of the TPM.  The following keys 
must be installed: AIK Credential, DoD CA public Key, and MANET symmetric key.  
While there is no native capability to store arbitrary keys through the TPM Management 
Console in Windows Vista™ or the tpm-tools commands from TrouSerS on GNU/Linux, 
the TSS functions as defined by the TCG can be used to bind keys and arbitrary data 
stored externally from the TPM.  The Tspi_Data_Bind and Tspi_Data_Unbind methods 
can be used to perform TPM binding to the external keys that must be protected by the 
TPM [59].  Alternatively, if the keys were only to be accessible when the platform 
configuration is the same as when the keys were protected, then the Tspi_Data_Seal and 
Tspi_Data_Unseal operations could be used [59]. 
5. Backup Keys 
All of the keys in use by the TPM should be backed up for security.  Due to the 
sensitivity of the TPM Owner keys, if Active Directory (AD) is to be used to store a 
backup of the keys then the AD server must run Windows Server 2003 in order to 
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provide a high enough level of protection in accordance with Microsoft specifications 
[29]. Non-Microsoft environments may simply use any preferred method of secure 
backup they require.  Common secure backup measures may include encrypting the 
sensitive information onto a removable medium such as a CD/DVD or possibly using a 
safe to store the plaintext information written either to removable media or on paper, 
which is possible since the key lengths are only 160-bits (20 characters) long.  
6. Configure TPM 
The TPM-enabled system can be configured to allow and block specific TPM 
commands.  If some TPM commands will not be needed in the context of the MANET 
field environment, then these commands should be safely disabled by the Depot 
Administrator to reduce potential security risks.  On Microsoft Windows Vista™, the 
TPM Management snap-in to the Microsoft Management Counsel provides the 
functionality to selectively allow and block specific TPM commands [36].  This may be 
used to block any TPM commands that will not be necessary for use in the field 
environment.  The Command Management listing also identifies which commands are 
blocked by default due to group policy as well as command deprecation and deletion.  On 
GNU/Linux, TPM Manager currently supports basic TPM administration tasks [50]. 
While the specifics of which commands can safely be blocked and those that must 
be allowed cannot be determined until further testing is performed, some TPM 
commands can clearly be identified as not being necessary for use and therefore they 
should be disabled.  Several TPM commands are used to configure the TPM by settting 
internal flags so that other TPM commands can or cannot be used.  For instance, 
TPM_DisableOwnerClear prevents the TPM Owner from ever clearing the TPM and thus 
requiring physical presence and the TPM_ForceClear command before the 
TPM_DisableForceClear is issued within the current system power cycle.  The 
TPM_KillMaintenanceFeature may also safely be issued since there will be no changes 
made to the systems once they are deployed into the Field until they return to the Depot. 
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7. Configure Disk Encryption 
The most common and well supported application of TPMs is for disk encryption 
software, since the decryption key can be stored on the PC inside of the TPM but off of 
the hard disk where it may be found and copied.  Other than a TPM, one would normally 
have to use an external USB drive to store the decryption keys securely away from the 
platform hard disk.  For TPM-enabled hard disk encryption, Microsoft offers BitLocker 
[35] for the Ultimate and Enterprise editions of Windows Vista™.  On GNU/Linux 
platforms, eCryptFS [12] can be used with the TPM Keyring from TrouSerS [53] to 
provide a TPM-protected encrypted file system.  Due to the sensitivity of information 
stored on the laptops and the risk of laptops being stolen, an encrypted file system 
provides a robust protection mechanism for data security. 
8. Configure Trusted Boot 
One of the main features of the TPM is the capability to perform Integrity 
Reporting by recording the state of system execution since system reset.  By extending 
PCR registers with measurements of the boot sector of the disk, operating system startup 
and other system startup processes, the recorded execution state that a system has entered 
can be compared against a known trusted secure value, and then a decision can 
automatically be enforced to halt execution or disallow access to information in the case 
of sealed data.  On Microsoft Windows Vista™, a secure boot process may be configured 
when the TPM is configured.  On GNU/Linux platforms, the current best practice for a 
trusted boot is to use TrouSerS and Trusted Grub as the boot loader which allows for the 
integrity metrics to be made and recorded for the master boot record, boot loader, kernel 
and other processes during system startup.  For a laptop, extra precaution must be taken 
to prevent the machine from transitioning into a Sleep or Hibernate mode, since this 
changes the “trusted boot” status of the TPM.  On Windows Vista™, the TPM becomes 
inaccessible after a power state transition from sleep or hibernate mode [81]. 
D. TEST AND AUDIT 
After the system has gone through the predefined initialization and configuration 
processes, it needs to go through adequate operational and security testing.  This testing 
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will ensure that there are no hardware or software errors in the system that would affect 
its operational effectiveness.   Automated scripts should be used for testing and verifying 
the system configuration and audit logs should be stored along with other archive data 
about the system.  
E. DELIVERY 
After the configuration has been tested and proven functional, the system is ready 
for deployment.  There must be a secure and authenticated delivery mechanism to 
transfer control of the systems from the administrator at the depot to the responsible field 
operators, and each laptop must be securely protected in the field environment.  Once the 
handoff is complete, there is not further configuration necessary until the systems return 
























The many features of the TPM create a potential for great benefit to the security 
of distributed and remote environments such as P2P, MANET, and Grid computing.  The 
TPM hardware provides for the secure generation and storage of encryption keys, which 
are essential for protecting information from unauthorized disclosure and attack by 
software methods in distributed environments.  The multiple Attestation Identity Keys 
provide a trusted cryptographic identity that can be used to support identification and 
authentication services for any TPM-enabled device, potentially for multiple 
simultaneous environments.  The integrity reporting functionality of the TPM can be used 
to test if the system is in a particular configuration or state whereupon certain 
cryptographic keys and operations may be performed.  If the system has not reached a 
predefined secure state as measured from system boot, (e.g., the system has been booted 
by external media or on a different hardware environment) then operations such as 
decryption of the hard drive would not succeed and prevent exposing sensitive 
information into an untrusted environment. 
This thesis has outlined the initial security considerations for an example CONOP 
in which an enterprise, such as the DoD in this example, may leverage the use of TPMs 
in a distributed and hostile environment.  First, the background on the functional nature 
and capabilities of the TPM were examined, notably that it provides trusted cryptographic 
operations and is bound to a single hardware platform.  Also, the supporting environment 
of the TPM was also discussed; the Trusted Building Blocks (TBB) which is the 
hardware assumed to be trusted for system startup prior to the use of the TPM, and the 
TSS which provides the interface between the TPM hardware and the software operating 
environment.  Other background information was also provided on MANETs and the 
MYSEA Testbed at NPS.  The latter is being used to conduct research in constructing 
high assurance multilevel secure architectures that incorporate open standards. 
A plausible scenario was then built using a MANET of TPM-enabled systems in a 
hostile environment.  To construct such a system, a Threat Analysis was conducted to 
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derive Objectives and Requirements for its engineering.  The security considerations for 
acquisition and design of such a system were analyzed, as well as the process necessary 
to initialize a TPM-enabled system for use in the proposed scenario.  A process was 
provided for the initialization of such a system, and a guideline specifically created for 
using the Microsoft Windows Vista™ operating system.  While all versions of Windows 
Vista™ have native support the TPM, only the Ultimate and Enterprise editions support 
the BitLocker hard drive encryption system which utilizes the TPM.  As for GNU/Linux 
environments, hard disk encryption and protection systems that utilize the TPM are 
available though primitive; and the standard TSS for Linux (TrouSerS) currently is not up 
to date to support the additional features of the TPM v1.2 specification.   With the 
analysis for a secure system initialization complete, the design and implementation of the 
operational configuration can be pursued for future work. 
B. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Since the security of the TPM was designed for COTS use, there are several 
considerations that a large enterprise, such as the DoD, should address before using 
TPM-enabled systems to secure sensitive or even classified information.  These 
considerations have been highlighted below. 
1. Revoke the EK 
The ability to revoke trust in the Endorsement Key (EK) that ships with the TPM 
is a new optional feature found in the TPM v1.2 specification.  Prior to this, the root key 
which established the identity of the TPM was bound to the TPM by the manufacturing 
process and could never be removed.  This new functionality would be most 
advantageous to an enterprise that may wish to take advantage of the security 
enhancements of the TPM, but cannot risk the use of an externally owned key for its root.  
It is therefore recommended that only TPMs that support the optional 
“TPM_RevokeTrust” and “TPM_CreateRevocableEK” commands be used thus the 
highest level of trust can be placed in the TPM operations.  This will enable the system 
owner to revoke the default EK so that an enterprise-generated one can be installed.  
Since these two commands, the revocation and creation of the EK, are designed to only 
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be executed once in the lifetime of a TPM for standard use, these functions may not be 
available from a typical TPM administration application.  A special-purpose application 
may be needed to communicate with the TSS and execute these TPM API commands. 
Another possibility is to specially order TPMs without the EK, and then to create 
and install the EK within the Depot.  Alternatively, if the TPM manufacturer is to be 
trusted, then nothing needs to be done about the EK since it is already created and stored 
in a shielded-location in the TPM [57]. 
2. Tamper Evidence 
The TPM only provides “tamper evidence” and not “tamper resistance” most 
likely due to cost constraints in mass producing a technology that will primarily be used 
by home users where the risk of TPM tampering is relatively low.  Some environments 
such as those of the DoD may require “tamper resistance.” In that case, the TPM may not 
be adequate to address the risk without some additional level of physical protection to 
establish “tamper resistance”. 
3. TSS 
A TSS needs to be chosen that supports TPM v1.2 commands in order to revoke 
trust in the TPM and create a new EK, as well as other additional features and commands.  
It should be noted that currently the TrouSerS TSS package for GNU/Linux only 
supports v1.1b of the TPM specification [55].  The TSS found in Microsoft Windows 
Vista™ supports TPM v1.2 commands.  There may also be other third-party TPM drivers 
and TSS suites to choose from for the operating system from commercial and open-
source entities [45, 66].  It should also be noted, that if subversion of the TSS is 
considered a threat, then a high assurance TSS that is part of a high assurance system 
architecture should be considered.  
4. Operating System 
In order to make full use of the TPM, the operating system should not only 
provide interfaces to the TPM, but should also include security features based on TPM 
technology.  While all versions of Microsoft Windows Vista™ appear to support TPM 
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v1.2, only the Ultimate and Enterprise editions support the BitLocker hard drive 
encryption service.  Note that the Linux kernel 2.6.12-rc2 and later has native support for 
the tpmdd TPM device driver and a hard disk encryption system, eCryptfs, that utilizes 
the TPM, but at the time of this writing it is currently unstable and therefore should not 
be considered ready for immediate commercial use [53].   
5. Secure Boot 
Since the TPM is capable of performing measurements of system execution 
integrity independent of the operating system, it may be used to enable or disable a 
system from booting or performing a TPM related operation (e.g., provide access to a 
TPM protected decryption key) unless all of the integrity and reporting conditions are 
met.  The BitLocker service provides a trusted boot path through which system boot 
integrity can be measured before the operating system partition is decrypted and made 
available.  Other trusted boot research is ongoing, such as utilizing the TPM on 
GNU/Linux with the GRUB boot loader to conduct a trusted boot process [44, 54].   
6. Laptops 
The laptop should be configured to always be on after system startup and to not 
automatically switch to Sleep mode, that is, a low-power state where the users session 
remains in memory.  If the system were to enter this low-power state, access to the TPM 
will be disabled since the TPM has not transitioned directly from a power-on state to the 
issuance of the TPM_Init and TPM_Startup commands.  Upon attempt to launch the TPM 
Management Console in Microsoft Windows Vista™ after resuming from Sleep mode, 
the error returned is “No compatible TPM found” and subsequently, “This action failed.  
The command was received in the wrong sequence relative to TPM_Init and a subsequent 
TPM_Startup”.  If the TPM_SaveState was invoked before transitioning into a low-power 




Figure 9 Sleep Mode Error for TPM on Microsoft Windows Vista™ 
 
7. Disk Encryption 
It appears that the most popular use for TPMs currently is to provide a type of 
hard drive encryption where the keys are protected by the TPM.  In Microsoft Windows 
Vista™, this is supported by the BitLocker service which is available in the Ultimate and 
Enterprise editions of Vista.  For GNU/Linux environments, the eCryptfs filesystem [12], 
native in Linux kernel 2.6.19 and above, currently offers preliminary support for TPM 
key storage [13].  The Enforcer security module for Linux released by Dartmouth in 2003 
was use to provide file system integrity by using the TPM to store the key to an encrypted 
loopback file system [17, 49], but at the time of this writing it appears to no longer be 
under active development [69].  
C. FUTURE WORK 
While this thesis provides a preliminary investigation into the steps necessary to 
establish a secure initialization of the TPM, much more work remains. 
1. MANET Network Protocols Using TPMs 
For the nodes to establish mutual authentication before participating in the 
MANET, a common protocol must first be established.  The design and implementation 
of such a protocol will need to be secure against possible attacks. Therefore reuse of a 
well established protocol is suggested.  For example, the TLS/SSL two party mutual 
authentication protocol for clients and servers could be used [10].  It could employ a 
Diffie-Hellman method for the establishment of a session key [42].  The session key 
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would then be used by the two parties for all future communication.  Performance and 
traffic analysis of this implementation should be conducted to establish throughput, 
scalability of session key negotiations, optimal session key lifetime, encryption and 
decryption time and a cost-benefit analysis of its effect on routing if multiple encrypted 
transmissions must be made of the same message to broadcast to all associated neighbors.  
The generation of a single session key for use by each deployment is another option.  
2. Multiple MANET Authorization 
Sometimes a node needs to be associated with more than one MANET.  Two 
possible ways to achieve this are discussed here.  First, the AIK Credential of a node may 
state that it is authorized to associate with more than one MANET deployment name.  By 
using the X509v3 certificate format [11], any number of additional “Subject Alternate 
Names” may be specified as an extension to the certificate.  Each additional name could 
correspond to a different MANET, and as long as the name appeared on the Credential, 
the node would be authorized to associate with other nodes of that deployment.  The 
positive aspect of this option is that only one AIK Credential ever needs to be created and 
distributed per node.  One potential hazard is that now every other node also knows all of 
the MANET deployments that the other nodes are authorized to access.  One drawback to 
this is the security and privacy concern of using one AIK identity for multiple domains.   
A second possible solution is to generate multiple AIKs and have a different AIK 
private key and AIK Credential for every MANET deployment the node wishes to 
associate with. There is extra work involved in generating multiple AIK Credentials and 
managing the additional keys, but the linking of an identity across multiple domains is 
addressed.  Under the current CONOP assumptions though, every deployment which the 




A. TPM ASSUMPTIONS 
As stated in the TCPA Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Protection Profile 
(Version 1.9.7) [52], the two assumptions of the TPM include: 1) proper configuration 
and 2) a physically secure environment.  The TPM Assumptions in Table 35 have been 
recreated from the TPM Protection Profile to include both the usage and environmental 
assumptions [52].  For the assumption name in the table, the prefix “A” is used for an 
assumption of the TPM and “AE” for an assumption of the environment in which it is 
used.  The Depot environment provides for the physical protection assumption.  The 
assumption names are used simply for ease of reference. 
 
Table 35 TPM Assumptions 
# Assumption Name Description 
1 A.Configuration The TPM will be properly installed and configured. 
2 AE.Physical_Protection The TPM provides tamper evidence only. It provides no protection 
against physical threats such as simple power analysis, differential 
power analysis, external signals, or extreme temperature. Physical 
protection is assumed to be provided by the environment. 
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B. TBB ASSUMPTIONS 
The assumptions of the TBB Protection Profile [8] are defined in Table 36.  There 
is only one assumption of the environment for the TBB, which is prefixed with “AE” for 
convention. 
Table 36 TBB Assumptions 
# Assumption Name Description 
1 AE.Certified_TPM The TPM connected to the TBB is a CC certified component, compliant 
with the TCG TPM PP, and is present during any operation of the TBB. 
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C. TPM THREATS 
In the TCPA TPM Protection Profile version 1.9.7, Section 3.2 “Threats to 
Security” outlines all of the threats taken into consideration in the design of the TPM for 
commercial use.  These threats are presented here in Table 37 for reference [52].  
 
Table 37 Threats to TPM Security 
# Threat Name Description 
 
1 T.Attack An undetected compromise of the cryptography-related IT assets 
may occur as a result of an attacker (whether an insider or 
outsider) attempting to perform actions that the individual is not 
authorized to perform. 
2 T.Bypass An unauthorized individual or user may tamper with security 
attributes or other data in order to bypass TOE security functions 
and gain unauthorized access to TOE assets. 
3 T.Export A user or an attacker may export data without security attributes 
or with unsecure security attributes, causing the data exported to 
be erroneous and unusable, to allow erroneous data to be added 
or substituted for the original data, and/or to reveal secrets. 
4 T.Hack_Crypto Cryptographic algorithms may be incorrectly implemented, 
allowing an unauthorized individual or user to decipher keys 
generated within the TPM and thereby gain unauthorized access 
to encrypted data. 
5 T.Hack_Physical An unauthorized individual or user of the TOE may cause 
unauthorized disclosure or modification of TOE assets by 
physically interacting with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities in the 
physical environment. 
6 T.Imperson An unauthorized individual may impersonate an authorized user of 
the TOE and thereby gain access to TOE data, keys, and 
operations. 
7 T.Import A user or attacker may import data or keys without security 
attributes or with erroneous security attributes, causing key 
ownership and authorization to be uncertain or erroneous and the 
system to malfunction or operate in an unsecure manner. 
8 T.Key_Gen_Destroy Cryptographic keys may be generated or destroyed in an 
unsecure manner, causing key compromise. 
9 T.Malfunction TOE assets may be modified or disclosed to an unauthorized 
individual or user of the TOE, through malfunction of the TOE. 
10 T.Modify An attacker may modify TSF or user data, e.g., stored security 
attributes or keys, in order to gain access to the TOE and its 
assets. 
11 T.Object_Attr_Default A user may create an object with no security attribute values. 
12 T.Object_Attr_Change A user or attacker may make unauthorized changes to security 
attribute values for an object. 
13 T.Object_SecureValues A user may set unsecure values for object security attributes. 
14 T.Residual_Info A user may obtain information that the user is not authorized to 
have when the data is no longer actively managed by the TOE 
(“data scavenging”). 
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15 T.Replay An unauthorized individual may gain access to the system and 
sensitive data through a “replay” or “man-in-the-middle” attack that 
allows the individual to capture identification and authentication 
data. 
16 T.Repudiate_Transact An originator of data may deny originating the data to avoid 
accountability. 
17 T.Test The TOE may start-up in an unsecure state or enter an unsecure 




D. TBB THREATS 
The Security Threats to the TBB and the IT Environment, as identified in the 
TBB Protection Profile, are contained in Tables 38 and 39.  Those threats which pertain 
to the TBB itself start with the naming convention “T.” while those threats in the IT 
Environment begin with “TE.” followed by the threat name. 
Table 38 TBB Threats 
# Threat Name Description 
1 T.CRTM_Not_First An attacker may cause other code to be executed prior to executing 
the CRTM code upon platform reset, thereby compromising the 
CRTM and causing the CRTM to become untrusted. 
2 T.Failure An attacker may gain access to secrets by causing the connection 
to the TPM to fail. 
3 T.Incorrect_CRTM An attacker may substitute a CRTM in the TOE, causing the CRTM 
to be invalidated and compromising the security of the data within 
the TPM. 
4 T.Malfunction A malfunction of the TOE may cause modification of TOE assets or 
cause TOE assets to be disclosed. 
5 T.Measure_Integrity The CRTM may fail to measure the integrity of the next component 
to execute and thereby cause a denial of service or a compromise of 
the security of data. 
6 T.Physical An attacker may cause disclosure or modification of TOE assets by 
physically interacting with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities in the 
physical environment. 
7 T.Protect An operation external to the TOE may interfere with TOE security 
functions or resources, causing disclosure of TSF data or other 
errors to occur. 
8 T.TPM_One_To_Many An attacker may disconnect the TPM from the platform and 
successfully reconnect the TPM with another platform, thereby 
compromising the security of the data within the TPM and 
invalidating the CRTM. 
 




9 TE.Bypass An attacker may bypass environmental security functions and gain 
unauthorized access to TBB assets. 
10 TE.Presence A remote attacker may cause the IT environment to pass an indication of 
physical presence to the TOE, thereby allowing the attacker to perform 
operations on the TPM that may only be performed when physically 
present at the platform. 
4 TE.Reset The CPU may reset without the TPM reset, resulting in a set of invalid 
PCR values and denial of service or the TPM may reset without a CPU 
reset, resulting in a TPM with PCRs set to their initial state (i.e., the value 
0), resulting in an untrusted root of trust. 
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E. TPM SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
The security objectives of the TPM as identified in the TPM Protection Profile 
[52] are identified in Tables 40 and 41.  Those objectives which are addressed by the 
TPM begin with an objective prefix “O” while those objectives addressed by the 
environment begin with the prefix “OE” [52]. 
Table 40 Security Objectives of the TPM 
# Objective Name Description 
1 O.Crypto_Key_Man The TPM shall generate and destroy cryptographic keys in a 
secure manner. 
2 O.Crypto_Op The TPM shall perform cryptographic operations, including 
secure hash, HMAC, RSA digital signature and signature 
verification, RSA encryption and decryption, and RSA key 
generation in accordance with specified algorithms and key 
size; key size must be sufficient size to protect private/public 
key pairs from deciphering. 
3 O.Crypto_Self_ The TPM shall provide the ability to verify that the 
cryptographic functions operate as designed. 
4 O.DAC The TPM shall control and restrict user access to the TPM 
assets in accordance with a specified access control policy. 
5 O.Export When data are exported outside the TPM, the TPM shall 
ensure that the data security attributes being exported are 
unambiguously associated with the data. 
6 O.Fail_Secure The TPM shall preserve the secure state of the system in the 
event of a cryptographic or other failure. 
7 O.General_Integ_Checks The TPM shall provide periodic checks on system integrity and 
user data integrity. 
8 O.HMAC The TPM shall provide the ability to detect the modification of 
security attributes and other data. 
9 O.I&A The TPM shall uniquely identify all users, and shall 
authenticate the claimed identify before granting a user access 
to the TPM facilities. 
10 O.Import When data are being imported into the TPM, the TPM shall 
ensure that the data security attributes are being imported with 
the data and the data is from authorized source. In addition, 
the TPM shall verify those security attributes according to the 
TSF access control rules. 
11 O.Invoke The TSF shall be invoked for all actions. 
12 O.Limit_Actions_Auth The TPM shall restrict the actions a user may perform before 
the TPM verifies the identity of the user. 
13 O.MessageNR The TPM shall provide user data integrity, source 
authentication, and the basis for source non-repudiation when 
exchanging data with a remote system. 
14 O.No_Residual_Info The TPM shall ensure there is no “object reuse,” i.e., ensure 
that there is no residual information in information containers or 
system resources upon their reallocation to different users. 
15 O.Object_Attr_Default The TPM shall require default security attributes for the object 
when the object is created. 
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16 O.Object_Attr_DefaultOver The TPM shall permit authorized users to override defaulted 
values for security attributes for an object. 
17 O.Obj_Attr_SecureValues The TPM shall maintain object security attributes by permitting 
only secure values. 
18 O.Security_Attr_Mgt The TPM shall allow only authorized users to initialize and 
change object security attributes. 
19 O.Security_Roles The TPM shall maintain security-relevant roles and association 
of users with those roles. 
20 O.Self_Protect The TSF will maintain a domain for its own execution that 
protects it and its resources from external interference, 
tampering, or unauthorized disclosure. 
20 O.Single_Auth The TPM shall provide a single use authentication mechanism 
and require re-authentication to prevent “replay” and “man-in-
the-middle” attacks. 
21 O.Tamper_ID The TPM shall provide features that permit a human to detect 
physical tampering of a system component. 
 




22 OE.Configuration The TPM shall be installed and configured properly for starting up the 
TPM in a secure state. 
23 OE.PhysSecurity The environment shall provide an acceptable level of physical security 
so that the TPM cannot be tampered with or be subject to side channel 




F. TBB SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
The security objectives of the TBB as identified in the TBB Protection Profile [8] 
are identified in Tables 42 and 43. 
Table 42 Security Objectives of the TBB 
# Objective Name Description 
1 O.Correct_CRTM The Security Functions shall unambiguously associate the CRTM with 
the TBB and the Security Functions shall enforce that the CRTM is the 
correct CRTM for the TBB. 
2 O.CRTM_First The TBB shall ensure that the CRTM code is the first code executed 
upon platform reset. 
3 O.Detect_Physical The TBB shall provide features that permit a human to detect at least 
one method of physical tampering with the TPM connection. 
4 O.Fail_Secure The TBB shall preserve a secure state in the event of failure of the TPM 
connection. 
5 O.Integrity The CRTM shall measure the integrity of the next component to execute 
and pass integrity data to the TPM. 
6 O.One_To_One The TBB shall enforce a one-to-one relationship between the TPM and 
the Platform. 
7 O.Secure_State The TBB shall maintain and recover to a secure state without security 
compromise after system error or other interruption of system operation. 
8 O.Self_Protect The Security Functions shall maintain a domain for its own execution 
that protects it and its resources from external interference, tampering, 
or unauthorized disclosure. 
 




9 OE.Certified_TPM The TPM included in the IT environment shall be a CC certified 
component, compliant with the TCG TPM PP and shall be present 
during any operation of the TBB. 
10 OE.Invoke The IT Environment shall invoke IT Environmental security functions 
defined to support the TBB Security Policy. 
11 OE.Presence The IT Environment shall pass an unambiguous indication of physical 
presence to the TBB. 
12 OE.Reset The IT Environment shall ensure that the CPU and TPM are reset 
simultaneously and that the reset signal shall be derived from or 
initiated by the platform reset or power-on signal. 
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G. TPM REQUIREMENTS 
The security requirements of the TPM as identified in the TPM Protection Profile 
[52] are identified in Table 44.  In the table, the requirement names and descriptions have 
been adjusted slightly for the sake of readability and condensation of the material. “FIA” 
for “Functional Identification and Authentication” “FTP” for “Functional Trusted 
Path/Channels” “FPT” for “Functional Protection of Security Functions” “FMT” for 
“Security Management” “FIA” for “Functional Identification and Authentication” “FDP” 
for “Functional User Data Protection” “FCS” for “Functional Cryptographic Support” 
“FCO” for Functional Communication” 




1 FCO.NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin: 
1) The TPM shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for 
transmitted TPM data signed using identity keys at all times 
2) The TPM shall be able to relate the identity of the originator of the 
information, and the TPM data of the information to which the evidence 
applies 3) TPM shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of 
information to recipient given evidence only available when requestor 
properly authenticates 
2 FCS.CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation: 
1) The TPM shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a 
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and specified 
cryptographic key sizes RSA 512, 1024, 2048 that meet: PKCS#1 V2 
3 FCS.CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: 
1) The TPM shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a 
specified cryptographic key destruction method erasure of memory areas 
containing cryptographic keys that meets the following: FIPS 140-1, 
Section 4.8.5, Key Destruction, or equivalent. 
4 FCS.COP.1 Cryptographic operation, RSA encrypt and decrypt: 
1) The TPM shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a 
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and specified 
cryptographic key sizes RSA 512, 1024, 2048 that meet: PKCS#1 V2 
Cryptographic Operation, RSA signature and signature verification: 
2) The TPM shall perform signature generation and signature verification 
in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm 
RSA and specified cryptographic key sizes RSA 512, 1024, 2048 that 
meet: PKCS#1 V2 
Cryptographic Operation, SHA 
3) The TPM shall perform secure hash in accordance with a specified 
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes not applicable 
that meet the following: FIPS 180-1. 
Cryptographic Operation, Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication 
4) The TPM shall perform keyed-hashing message authentication code 
(HMAC) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 
and cryptographic key sizes 160 bits that meet the following: RFC 2104. 
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5 FDP.ACC.1 Subset access control 
1) The TPM shall enforce Protected Operations Access Controls on 
a) Subjects: commands executing on behalf of users 
b) Objects: keys and user data 
c) Operations: signature generation, encryption or decryption 
6 FDP.ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 
1) The TPM shall enforce Protected Operations Access Controls to 
objects based on security attributes TCPA_AUTH_DATA_USAGE, 
TCPA_KEY_FLAGS, and TCPA_KEY_USAGE 
2) The TPM shall enforce the following rules to determine allowed use: 
a) Key and data access in defined as “owner” access or “world” based on 
the value of TCPA_AUTH_DATA_USAGE 
b) Cryptographic operations for each key are limited based on the 
specification of the TCPA_KEY_USAGE value 
3) The TPM shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based 
on the following additional rules: rules based on security attributes that 
explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects. 
4) The TPM shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on: 
rules based on security attributes that explicitly deny access of subjects to 
objects 
7 FDP.ETC.2 Export of user data with security attributes: 
1) The TPM shall enforce Protected Operations Access Controls when 
exporting user data, controlled under the security functional policy, outside 
of the scope of control. 
2) The TPM shall export the user data with the user data’s associated 
security attributes. 
3) The TPM shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported 
outside the TSC, are unambiguously associated with the exported user 
data. 
4) The TPM shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported 
from the TSC: A key may be encrypted for migration only if the migratable 
flag is set in TCPA_KEY_FLAGS, [assignment: additional exportation 
control rules]. 
8 FDP.ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes: 
1) The TPM shall enforce the Protected Operations Access Controls when 
importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC. 
2) The TPM shall use the security attributes associated with the imported 
user data. 
3) The TPM shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the 
unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user 
data received. 
4) The TPM shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the 
imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data. 
5) The TPM shall enforce the following rules when importing user data 
controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: [assignment: additional 
importation control rules]. 
9 FDP.RIP.2 Full residual information protection 
1) The TPM shall ensure that any previous information content of a 
resource is made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from 
all objects. 
10 FIA.ATD.1 User attribute definition 
1) The TPM shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging 
to individual users: authentication data, role. 
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11 FIA.UAU.1 Timing of identification 
1) The TPM shall allow access to data and keys where entity owner has 
given the “world” access based on the value of 
TCPA_AUTH_DATA_USAGE; access to the following commands: 
TPM_SelfTestFull, TPM_ContinueSelfTest, TPM_GetTestResult, 
TPM_PcrRead, TPM_DirRead, and TPM_EvictKey on behalf of the user 
to be performed before the user is authenticated. 
12 FIA.UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanism 
1) The TPM shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to the use 
of the “Object-Independent Authorization Protocol” (OI-AP) and the 
“Object-Specific Authorization Protocol” (OS-AP) protocols. 
13 FIA.UAU.6 Re-authenticating 
1) The TPM shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions: for every 
command that requires user authentication. 
14 FIA.UID.1 Timing of identification 
1) The TPM shall allow access to data and keys where entity owner has 
given the “world” access based on the value of 
TCPA_AUTH_DATA_USAGE; access to the following commands: 
TPM_SelfTestFull, TPM_ContinueSelfTest, TPM_GetTestResult, 
TPM_PcrRead, TPM_DirRead, and TPM_EvictKey on behalf of the user 
to be performed before the user is identified. 
2) The TPM shall require each user to be successfully identified before 
allowing any other TPM-mediated actions on behalf of that user. 
15 FMT.MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior 
1) The TPM shall restrict the ability to disable or enable the functions 
[assignment: list of functions] to the TPM owner. 
16 FMT.MSA.1 Management of security attributes 
1) The TPM shall enforce the Protected Operations Access Controls to 
restrict the ability to create the security attributes associated with a 
particular entity, including TCPA_KEY_USAGE, 
TCPA_AUTH_DATA_USAGE, migratable flag, and volatility flag to the 
entity owner. 
17 FMT.MSA.2 Secure security attributes 
1) The TPM shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security 
attributes. 
18 FMT.MSA.3 Static attribute initialization 
1) The TPM shall enforce the Protected Operations Access Controls to 
provide specific default values for security attributes that are used to 
enforce the SFP. 
2) The TPM shall allow the entity owner to specify alternative initial values 
to override the default values when an object or information is created. 
19 FMT.MTD.1 Management of Security Functions data – TPM Owner modify 
1) The TPM shall restrict the ability to modify the TPM data: Identification 
and authentication data associated with the Endorsement Key and 
SRK; Migration authorization data to the TPM Owner. 
TPM Owner create 
1) The TPM shall restrict the ability to generate the TPM data: Storage 
Root Key and TPMProof to the TPM Owner. 
Entity Owner 
1) The TPM shall restrict the ability to modify the TPM data: Identification 
and Authentication data associated with entity; to the entity Owner. 
Manufacturer 
1) The TPM shall restrict the ability to generate the TPM data: 
Endorsement Key Pair to the TPM manufacturer or designee. 
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20 FMT.SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles  
1) The TPM shall maintain the roles: TPM owner, owners of entities, and 
TPM manufacturer or designee. 
2) The TPM shall be able to associate users with roles. 
3) The TPM shall ensure that the condition: successful presentation of 
correct authentication data is satisfied.  
21 FPT.AMT.1 Abstract machine testing 
1) The TPM shall run a suite of tests during initial start-up and at the 
request of an authorized user to demonstrate the correct operation of the 
security assumptions provided by the abstract machine that underlies the 
TPM. 
22 FPT.FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state 
1) The TPM shall preserve a secure state when the following types of 
failures occur: failure of any crypto operations including RSA 
encryption, RSA decryption, SHA, RNG, RSA signature generation, 
HMAC generation; failure of any commands or internal operations. 
23 FPT.PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack 
1) The TPM shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering 
that might compromise the TPM. 
2) The TPM shall provide the capability to determine whether physical 
tampering with the TPM’s devices or TPM’s elements has occurred. 
24 FPT.RCV.4 Function recovery 
1) The TPM shall ensure that all TPM Commands have the property that 
the SF either completes successfully, or for the indicated failure scenarios, 
recovers to a consistent and secure state. 
25 FPT.RPL.1 Replay detection 
1) The TPM shall detect replay for the following entities: command 
requests that include the nonce parameter. 
2) The TPM shall perform destroy session when replay is detected. 
26 FPT.RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the Security Policy 
1) The TPM shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and 
succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed. 
27 FPT.SEP.1 Security Function domain separation 
1) The TPM shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that 
protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. 
2) The TPM shall enforce separation between the security domains of 
subjects in the TSC. 
28 FPT.TDC.1 Inter-Security Function basic data consistency 
1) The TPM shall provide the capability to consistently interpret TPM 
commands and responses when shared between the TPM and another 
trusted IT product. 
2) The TPM shall use the TCPA Main Specification when interpreting the 
TPM data from another trusted IT product. 
29 FPT.TST.1 Security Function testing 
1) The TPM shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and 
periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, 
and at the condition: prior to execution of the first call to a capability that 
uses those functions to demonstrate the correct operation of the TPM. 
2) The TPM shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the 
integrity of TPM data. 
3) The TPM shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the 
integrity of stored TPM executable code. 
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30 FTP.TRP.1 Trusted Path 
1) The TPM shall provide a communication path between itself and local 
or remote users that is logically distinct from other communication paths 
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the 
communicated data from modification or disclosure. 
2) The TPM shall permit the TPM, local or remote users to initiate 
communication via the trusted path. 
3) The TPM shall require the user of the trusted path for initial user 




H. TBB REQUIREMENTS 
The Security Function Requirements of the TBB and its IT Environment have 
been taken from the TBB Protection Profile and combined together in Tables 45 and 46.  
In the table, the requirement names and descriptions have been adjusted slightly for the 
sake of readability and condensation of the material.  The prefix “FPT” in the functional 
requirement name stands for “Functional Protection” and “FDP” stands for “Functional 
Data Protection” [8].   




1 FPT.Correct_CRTM CRTM is the correct CRTM:  
1) unambiguously associate a CRTM with the TBB, 2) security 
functions enforce CRTM is correct one 
2 FPT.Fail_Preserve Failure with preservation of a secure state:  
1) TBB shall preserve a secure state when failures occur. (CRTM 
failure cannot be detected, but if initial measurement cannot be 
made, TPM access is denied) 
3 FPT.CRTM_First CRTM first to execute:  
1) CRTM shall be the first code executed upon platform reset. 
4 FPT.Measure_Int Measures integrity of next component:  
1) CRTM shall measure the BIOS code and data to which control will 
be passed, 2) CRTM shall perform an extend operation to record 
measurements before passing control to the next component. Control 
is only passed to the component that was hashed and extended. 
5 FPT.One_To_One TPM associated one-to-one with platform:  
1) There shall be a one-to-one relationship between the TPM and 
platform.  A TPM removed from a motherboard must not be 
operational on another platform. 
6 FPT.Indicate_Attack Indication of physical attack on the TPM connection:  
1) The TBB security functions shall provide an unambiguous attack 
indication for at least one or more methods of physical tampering and 
2) determine if tampering of the TPM connection has occurred (e.g., 
removal or replacement of TPM). 
7 FPT.Func_Recovery Function recovery:  
1) The TBB Security Functions such as communication with the TPM, 
failure of communication, and other capabilities shall return either a 
status of successful completion or an indication of failure and recover 
to a consistent and secure state. 
8 FPT.Domain_Sep TBB Security Functions domain separation:  
1) The TBB Security Functions shall maintain a security domain for 
its execution that protects it from interference and tampering by 
untrusted subjects and 2) enforce separation between the security 
domains of subjects 
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9 FDP_IPP.1 Indication of physical presence: 
1) The IT Environment shall provide unambiguous indication of 
physical presence to the TBB. 
2) The indication of physical presence shall come from the physical 
presence connection. 
10 FPT_ENV_RST.1 Environment reset for CPU and TPM: 
1) The IT Environment shall provide a reset signal and ensure that it 
causes the CPU and TPM to be reset simultaneously and 2) the reset 
signal shall be derived or initiated by the platform reset or power-on 
signal 
11 FPT_RVM_ENV.1 Non-bypassability of the Security Functions: none 
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I. DEPOT MANAGEMENT PROCESS GUIDE 
This appendix provides the implementation details of the depot management 
process as outlined in Chapter V.  For each of the steps identified below, the technical 
details are provided on how to accomplish the task, and if possible, how to do so in 
multiple environments such as the BIOS and operating system.  This guideline is 
intended to serve only as a supplement to more definitive resources [33-37] on TPM 
management for the Depot System Administrator.  This guide is written for a computing 
environment consisting of Microsoft Windows Vista™ Business on the Dell™ Latitude 
D820 laptop with a Broadcom TPM (A2) v1.2 and BIOS version A01.  Administrator 
rights are required on the platform to perform the following procedures and this guide 
assumes the reader is well trained and familiar with system administration. 
1. Clear the TPM 
If there is already a TPM Owner installed on the TPM, then the TPM should be 
cleared either from within the system BIOS or via the TPM Management Console if the 
TPM Owner AuthData is available.  The TPM Owner AuthData may be typed in or 
provided as a file location when prompted to establish authorization to clear the TPM.  
Proof of physical presence is demonstrated by accessing the BIOS at system startup to 
establish authorization to clear the TPM if the Owner AuthData is lost. Table 46 provides 
the directions on how to clear the TPM in different environments. 
Table 47 Procedure to Clear the TPM 
Environment Procedure 
BIOS On Dell Latitude D820, during system boot up press F2 to enter the BIOS 
Setup.  On the left main menu, expand the Security tree and then select TPM 
Activation.  If the TPM is currently owned, the option “Clear” will be displayed 
in addition to “Deactivate” and “Activate” options.  Select “Clear” and reboot. 
Windows Vista™ Type Win+R to open the Run window and then type tpm.msc in the Open 
field and click OK to launch the TPM Management Console (Figure 10).  Click 
on Continue if presented with the User Account Control dialogue box.  In the 
Actions pane on the right-hand side of the TPM Management Console, click 
Clear TPM… to begin the Clear TPM process (Figure 11).  A window will pop 
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up and ask if you would like to type in the TPM owner password or select a 
file to which the TPM owner password was saved.  In this case, click on “I 
want to type the TPM owner password” (Figure 12) and then you will be 
prompted to enter it in the next window (Figure 13) and click Clear TPM… 
This process will deactivate the TPM and remove ownership. (Figure 14) 
 
 
Figure 10 Run the TPM Management Console 
 
 
Figure 11 Clear TPM Via TPM Management Console 
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Figure 12 Clear the TPM with AuthData 
 
 




Figure 14 TPM Ownership Cleared 
 
2. Disable the TPM 
Since the hard disk initialization steps do not require use of the TPM, the TPM 
can safely be disabled and deactivated.  The directions for ensuring the TPM is disabled 
and deactivated are provided in Table 48. 
Table 48 Procedure to Disable the TPM 
Environment Procedure 
BIOS On Dell Latitude D820, during system boot up press F2 to enter the BIOS 
Setup.  On the left main menu, expand the Security tree and then select TPM 
Security.  The options of “Off” and “On” are displayed.  Select “Off”.  (Figure 
15) Also under the TPM Security menu, select TPM Activation.  With no 
ownership of the TPM, the options displayed are “Deactivate” and “Activate”.  
Ensure “Deactivate” is selected then exit and reboot. (Figure 16) 
Windows Vista™ There is no known physical presence assertion to “Disable” an unowned TPM 




Figure 15 Disable the TPM in the BIOS 
 




3. Hard Disk Initialization 
The hard disk reinitialization or the “zero-fill” process will erase the hard drive at 
the lowest logical level, by writing a “0” to every sector of the disk such that all prior 
data on the disk is lost, including file system and partition information.  The operating 
environment and “zero-fill” process will need to execute and run independent from the 
drive to be erased, and this is usually done by booting from a utility CD provided by the 
hard drive manufacturer.  Table 49 describes the procedures to initialize a hard disk under 
several operating environments.   
 
Table 49 Procedure to Initialize the Hard Disk 
Environment Procedure 
Windows Vista™ In the Windows Preinstallation Environment, the diskpart utility used to 
partition the disk can be used to write all zeros to it by running: diskpart 
clean all 
Third Party It is very common to use third party software, such as a bootable utility CD 
provided by the manufacturer of the hard drive to write zeros to the disk.   
 
4.  Partition and Format 
The hard drive will need to be partitioned and formatted for use, though this can 
often be done automatically during the operating system installation.  For greater 
flexibility and control, the Administrator may wish to perform these operations manually 
for his or her own operating system environment.  See Table 50 for instructions. 
 
Table 50 Partition and Format Procedure 
Environment Procedure 
Windows Vista™ The system administrator may choose to partition and format the hard drive 
directly after hard disk initialization or during the operating system installation.  
From the Windows Pre-Boot Environment, the diskpart utility can be used 
with a script to create the partitions and the format command can be used to 
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format them.  If partitioning for use with BitLocker, two NTFS partitions will 
need to be created.  The first one from which the computer boots will need to 
be at least 1.5GB and the operating system drive at least roughly 12GB.  For 
more details, see [30] for instructions. 
 
5. Enable the TPM 
The TPM should be enabled so that the hardware device is seen during the 
installation of the new operating system.  Since there is no ownership of the TPM at this 
time and the operating system is not installed, physical presence will need to be 
demonstrated in the BIOS in order to set the TPM to the Enabled and Deactivated state.  
The procedure to enable the TPM in the system BIOS is presented in Table 51. 
 
Table 51 Procedure to Enable the TPM 
Environment Procedure 
BIOS On Dell Latitude D820, during system boot up press F2 to enter the BIOS 
Setup.  On the left main menu, expand the Security tree and then select TPM 
Security.  The options of “Off” and “On” are displayed.  Select “On” as this 
will “Enable” the TPM.  Just under the TPM Security menu, select TPM 
Activation.  With no ownership of the TPM, the options displayed are 
“Deactivate” and “Activate”.  Ensure “Deactivate” is still selected and reboot.  
Windows Vista™ There is no known physical presence assertion to “Enable” an unowned TPM 
via the TPM Management Console on Windows Vista™. 
 
6. Install OS & Software 
The operating system and any additional supporting software, such as a TPM 
driver and a TCG Software Stack (TSS) from a third party, can be installed at this time 
from trusted sources.  All software configurations that do not require use of the TPM 
should be done at this time since the TPM is not fully operational until ownership has 
been taken.  If any software requires use of the TPM, it should be configured after TPM 
ownership has been taken. 
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7. Activate the TPM 
The TPM needs to be both enabled and activated at this point.  Since there is 
currently no TPM owner, this operation must be performed and authorized by evidence of 
physical presence. After a reboot, the TPM initialization process may begin and TPM 
ownership taken.  Table 52 provides the procedures for activating the TPM. 
 
Table 52 Procedure to Activate the TPM 
Environment Procedure 
BIOS On Dell Latitude D820, during system boot up press F2 to enter the BIOS 
Setup.  On the left main menu, expand the Security tree and then select TPM 
Activation.  With no ownership of the TPM, the options displayed are 
“Deactivate” and “Activate”.  Ensure “Activate” is selected and reboot. 
Windows Vista™ There is no known physical presence assertion to “Activate” an unowned TPM 
via the TPM Management Console on Windows Vista™. 
 
8. Revoke TPM Trust 
The capability to revoke TPM trust was not tested because it is not available in 
the operating environment used in this thesis (e.g., Dell Latitude D820 with Microsoft 
Windows Vista™ Business), either due to lack of support in the TPM hardware, 
operating system or TSS.   
9. Create EK 
Since the capability to revoke TPM trust is not available in the example operating 
environment used in this thesis (e.g., Dell Latitude D820 with Microsoft Windows 
Vista™ Business), the capability to create a new EK for the TPM was also not tested. 
10. Take Ownership 
When the TPM is both Enabled and Activated with no TPM Owner currently set, 
the TPM ownership may be taken.  The process of taking ownership of the TPM is  
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sometimes referred to as “Initializing the TPM” since in essence, this process should only 
need to happen once per system use lifecycle.  Table 53 provides the procedures on how 
to take ownership of the TPM. 
 
Table 53 Procedure to Take Ownership of the TPM 
Environment Procedure 
Windows Vista™ Type Win+R to open the Run window and then type tpm.msc in the Open 
field and click OK to launch the TPM Management Console (Figure 10).  Click 
on Continue if presented with the User Account Control dialogue box.  In the 
Actions pane on the right-hand side, click Initialize TPM… (Figure 17).  A 
pop up window will ask you to choose to automatically or manually create the 
TPM password.  Click on “Manually create the password” (Figure 18).  In 
the next window type in the TPM password twice and then click Initialize 
(Figure 19). The initialization process will take a moment and then a window 
will announce “Initialization completed”.  Click on Close to close the window 




Figure 17 Initialize TPM in TPM Management Console 
 
 




Figure 19 Type a TPM Owner Password 
 
 




Figure 21 Ownership Completed in TPM Management Console 
 
11. TPM Self-Test 
Every time that a TPM-enabled system starts up, the TPM is designed to go 
through a full self-test of its functional operation.  If any error is encountered, the system 
will fail to boot and issue a TPM Failed Self-Test error message.  If the system does not 
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